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PRINCIPLES OF MARYLAND PROCUREMENT LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Scott A. Livingstont 
Lydia B. Hoovertt 
The State of Maryland, consistent with other states, buys goods 
and services to implement major government programs.' The State 
t B.A., Clark University, 1972; J.D., Antioch School of Law, 1975; Assistant At-
torney General of Maryland, 1976-83; Partner, Rifkin, Livingston, Levitan & 
Silver, LLC. 
tt B.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1995; J.D., William & Mary School of 
Law, 1998; Associate, Rifkin, Livingston, Levitan & Silver, LLC. 
1. See Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 775, 1980 Md. Laws 2650 (originally codified at 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, §§ 1-101 to 9-218 (1981), now codified at MD. CODE 
ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. (1995 & Supp. 1999». The 49 other states and the 
District of Columbia have codified their own procurement articles. See ALA. 
CODE §§ 41-16-1 to -144 (1991 & Supp. 1999); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 36.05.010 to 
.95.010 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-2501 to -2662 
(West 1999); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 19-11-101 to -806, 22-9-101 to -702 (Michie 
1998 & Supp. 1999); CAL. PUB. CaNT. CODE §§ 100 to 22355 (West 1985 & 
Supp. 2000); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-101-101 to -112-101 (West 1990 & 
Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4A-50 to -80, 4b-91 to -102 (West 1998 
& Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 6901-6986 (1997 & Supp. 1998); 
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1101 to -1177.7, 1-1181.1 to -1191.4 (1999); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 287.001 to .1345 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-10-1, 
36-10-1 to -5,50-5-50 to -124,50-5-130 to -133 (1998 & Supp. 1999); HAw. REv. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 103D-101 to -1304 (Michie 1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 54-1901 to -
1930, 67-5710 to -5778 (1994 & Supp. 1999); 30 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 500/1-1 
to 99-5 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-13.4-1-1 to .4-10-7, 5-22-1-1 to -22-12 
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 18.1 to .63, 72.1 to 73A.21 
(West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-3737a to -3744 (1999); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 45A005 to .485 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:1551 
to :1736 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 155, §§ 1811 to 
1825-1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30B, §§ 1 to 19 
(West 1992 & Supp. 1999); MICH. CaMP. LAws ANN. §§ 18.1237 to .1295 (West 
1994 & Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16C.02 to .25 (West 1997 & Supp. 
2000); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-1 to -11-31 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 34.010 to 
.359 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 18-4-121 to -407 (1999); 
NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-101 to -401 (Michie 1996); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 
333.010 to .500, 338.140 to .147 (Michie 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1:1-
21 to :72, 228:1 to :5a, 237:44 (1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:32-1 to :36-4 (West 
1996 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1-21 to -199 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 
1999); NY GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 100 to 109-b (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2000); 
1 
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Finance and Procurement Article of the Maryland Code ("Procure-
ment Article")2 and its regulations3 govern the award of state con-
tracts for the purchase of goods and services. There is a tension-
easy to feel but difficult to define-between the points where writ-
ten procurement laws yield to unwritten actual practices, where 
rules for contract award seem more mercurial than stable, and 
where the contractor's cost expectations oppose the procurement 
officer's zeal for greater value. Among these points lay the practical 
principles of procurement law. 
The modern era of Maryland procurement law began in 1976 
with the State's waiver of sovereign immunity as a defense to con-
tract actions,4 and continued with the enactment of the Procure-
ment Article.s The Maryland General Assembly codified broad rules 
to establish a uniform system for the purchase of goods and services 
by state agencies. The Procurement Article has subsequently given 
rise to approximately 400 pages of procurement regulations.6 The 
application of these regulations to actual procurement disputes, in-
cluding bid protests and claims arising under procurement con-
tracts, has given rise to approximately 1200 appeals docketed with 
the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (MSBCA) since its 
creation in 1980.7 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-48-60, 143-128 to -135.9 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 44-
0~1 to -02, 54-44.4-01 to .4-09 (1989 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 
125.07 to .111 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); OKlA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 101 to 
138 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 279.005 to .990 (1999); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 101 to 4509 (West 1993 & Supp. 1999); RI. GEN. LAws §§ 
37-2-1 to -76.1 (1997 & Supp. 1999); S.c. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35-10 to -5270 (Law. 
Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 5-18-1 to -23-49 (Michie 
1994 & Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-4-101 to -802 (1999); TEX. GoV'T 
CODE ANN. §§ 2151.001 to 2177.003 (West 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-56-1 
to -73 (1997 & Supp. 1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4001-09, tit. 32, § 3113 
(1994 & Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 
1999); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 39.04.010 to .96.903 (West 1991 & Supp. 
1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 5-6-7; 5A-3-1 to -55A (1993 & Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 16.70 to .847, 62.15 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-
6-101 to -805 (Michie 1999). 
2. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 11-101 to 17-402. 
3. See Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 21.01.01 to .14.07 (1999). 
4. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 12-201(a) (1999) ("[TJhe State, its officers, 
and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract 
action ... "). 
5. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC §§ 11-101 to 17-402. 
6. See COMAR 21.01.01 to .14.07. 
7. In 1981, the Maryland Department of Transportation Board of Contract Ap-
1999] Maryland Procurement Law 3 
Judicial decisions,s Opinions of the Attorney General of Mary-
land, and Advisory Opinions of the Maryland State Ethics Commis-
sion provide most of the remaining written legal sources prescribing 
how and to whom contracts are awarded. The Board of Public 
Works (BPW),9 which has legal authority to control procurement, 
furnishes a source of procurement "realpolitik," if not law. Instead 
of the fiction that Maryland procurement law consists solely of the 
application of known rules to visible facts, vendors and their coun-
sel confront a rougher source of law: a fine blend of rules and writ-
ten and unwritten practices of law and lore, mixed in with notions 
of fair play and political mischief. 
The tensions in the community of interests involved in state 
procurement are reflected in the award of contracts. A contract 
with the State implicates the community of taxpayers and its repre-
sentatives, procurement officers and their using agencies, and the 
MSBCA members and the judges who review MSBCA decisions 
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). \0 To borrow a 
phrase from Justice Holmes, there is some play between the joints 
of the procurement machinery. I I There is a fair measure of rough-
ness among the parties involved, each pursuing its own, sometimes 
peals became the Maryland State Board of Contract Appeals (MSBCA), with 
jurisdiction to hear bid protests as well as contract claims. See Scott A. Living-
ston, Fair Treatment For Contradors Doing Business with the State of Maryland, 15 
U. BALT. L. REv. 215, 215-16 (1986). 
8. For judicial decisions interpreting the State Finance and Procurement Article 
since 1986, see Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Co. Bd. of Ed., 358 
Md. 129, 747 A.2d 625 (2000); SHA v. David A. Bramble, Inc., 351 Md. 226, 
717 A.2d 943 (1998); Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 1230 A.2d 
709 (1998); The Driggs Corp. v. Maryland Aviation Admin., 348 Md. 389, 704 
A.2d 433 (1998); University of Md. v. MFE Inc./NCP Architects, Inc., 345 Md. 
86, 691 A.2d 676 (1997); ARA Health Servs., Inc. v. Department of Public 
Safety and Correctional Svs., 344 Md. 85, 685 A.2d 485 (1996); Maryland State 
Police v. Warwick Supply & Equip. Co., 330 Md. 474, 624 A.2d 1238 (1993); 
Department of Gen. Servs. v. Harmans Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 98 Md. App. 
535, 624 A.2d 1238 (1993); McLean Contracting Co. v. Maryland Transp. 
Auth., 70 Md. App. 514, 527 A.2d 51 (1987). 
9. For the creation and powers of the Board of Public Works (BPW), see CONST. 
OF MD., DECL. RTS., art. XII, §§ 1-3; MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 12-
101 to -109 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR 21.02.01.01 to .08. 
10. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 12-101, -105. 
11. See Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931) ("[TJhe interpretation 
of constitutional principles must not be read too literal. We must remember 
that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a lit-
tle play in its joints."). 
4 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 29 
enlightened, self-interest. The result is an evolving set of standards, 
sometimes clear and other times opaque, which generally leads to 
the award of contracts to the proper party. This, in turn, mostly in-
ures to the benefit of the public. 
The enactment of the Procurement Article solidified the mod-
ern procurement era, but its emergence began a few years earlier.I2 
The scandalous resignation of Governor and later Vice President 
Spiro Agnew in 1973-a direct consequence of his nefarious prac-
tices in Maryland procurement-prompted the enactment of a ver-
sion of the ABA Model Procurement Code into Maryland law. I3 In 
1976, the State waived sovereign immunity as a defense to written 
contracts, thereby forcing executive accountability via judicial scru-
tiny of the procurement process. I4 The Maryland General Assembly 
recognized the importance of establishing a neutral forum for bid 
protests and contract disputes. Vendors and state officials realized 
that decisions regarding the purchasing of billions of dollars of 
goods and services would be made in the sunshine. Prior to that 
time, the absence of any judicial process for disputes arising out of 
state contracts meant, among other things, that there was no body 
of law to guide future bid protests and disputes. There was little ba-
sis for public confidence that these matters would be resolved based 
on merit rather than on malleable, political factors hardly related to 
legal principles. 
This Article reviews procurement law, decisions of the MSBCA, 
regulations, and case law since 1986 and focuses on the rules con-
cerning contract award. I5 Part II provides the current status of the 
12. See generally Livingston, supra note 7, at 216-32. 
13. See C. Fraser Smith, Lottery Bidding Now Politicized, Contractor Says, THE SUN 
(BALT.), Nov. 30, 1990, at lD, available in 1990 WL 4113694. Around the time 
Agnew resigned from the vice presidency, charges arose that he took kick-
backs and bribes from contractors while he was the Governor of Maryland. See 
id. 
14. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 12-201(a) (1999) ("[T]he State, its officers, 
and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract 
action ... "). 
15. For an overview of Maryland procurement law from the time prior to the en-
actment of the Procurement Article through 1986, see Livingston, supra note 
7, at 215-45. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the laws and pro-
cedures related to contract claims brought by either a contractor or the State. 
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 15-215 to -223 (1995 & Supp. 1999); 
COMAR 2l.lO.04.01 to .06. For a discussion of the discrepancies between the 
State Finance and Procurement Article and COMAR Title 21 concerning 
claims brought by the State, and the implications with respect to the MSBCA's 
1999] Maryland Procurement Law 5 
law governing pre-solicitation communications between the procur-
ing agency and the potential contractor. 16 Part III details the issu-
ance of solicitations I? in the form of Requests for Proposals (RFPs) 18 
or Invitations for Bids (IFBs) .19 Part IV discusses bid protests, the 
method by which a contractor or vendor may raise objections to a 
solicitation or the formation of a contract.20 Part V discusses signifi-
cant procedural considerations.21 Part VI details the adverse conse-
quences that the State would suffer as an indirect, yet substantial, 
result of treating contractors unfairly.22 
II. PRE-SOLICITATION 
In the "pre-solicitation phase" of state procurement, state offi-
cials first must decide what goods or services meet the using 
agency's minimal needs. The procurement officer handles the 
purchases of goods and services that other officials use to fulfill 
their functions. 23 
"Procurement" includes all the functions of the State that per-
tain to "buying, leasing as lessee, purchasing, or otherwise obtaining 
any supplies, services, construction, [and] construction-related ser-
vices . . . . "24 It reaches from the solicitation of sources and award 
of the contracts to all phases of contract administration.25 As the 
"customer," the State enters into contracts with vendors for the 
purchase of goods and services. The mechanics of contract forma-
tion on a state procurement level, akin to contracts in the private 
sector, involve offer and acceptance. Ordinarily, in state procure-
jurisdiction, see University of Md. v. MFE Inc./NCP Architects, Inc., 345 Md. 
86, 691 A.2d 676 (1997); Alcatel NA Cable Systems, Inc., 5 MSBCA t 458 
(1999). 
16. See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text. 
17. For the purposes of this Article, the term "solicitation" will often be used col-
loquially to refer to either the issuance of a Request for Proposals (RFPs) or 
an Invitation for Bids (IFBs). Strictly, however, solicitation refers only to Re-
quests for Proposals. The term "bid" will be used comprehensively to reach "a 
bid, proposal, or other response to a solicitation." MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. 
& PROC. § 4-301(b). 
18. See infra Part IlIA. 
19. See infra Part III.B. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. See infra Part V. 
22. See infra Part VI. 
23. For example, the Department of General Services procures police cars for the 
Maryland State Police. 
24. See COMAR 21.01.02.OlB(65) (1999). 
25. See ill. 
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ment, the potential vendor is the offeror and the State is the 
offeree. 
Prior to the issuance of a solicitation, the procurement officer 
should examine the using agency's needs in light of the goods and 
services available in the commercial marketplace. The procurement 
officer often encounters potential vendors who encourage the State 
to request the goods and services they sell. Such salesmanship may 
lead the procurement officer and using agency to have a particular 
preference for goods and services. Ordinarily, this is permissible un-
less the resulting specifications are unduly burdensome or 
unethical. 26 
Official publication of a solicitation starts the most visible phase 
of procurement. It is a public statement that the State wishes to en-
courage potential parties to compete, by submission of bids or pro-
posals, for contract award. En route to public solicitation, there are 
various rules governing the parties during the pre-solicitation phase. 
A. The Specifications 
The procurement officer has the difficult job of ensuring that 
his "client"-the actual using agency that requires the goods and 
services-obtains the goods and services necessary to do the job. 
For example, the Department of General Services (DGS) purchases 
office furniture so that another state agency is suitably equipped; it 
likewise enters into contracts for bridges in state parks for the De-
partment of Natural Resources. Not uncommonly, the procurement 
officer or the using agency have a particular preference for a partic-
ular product by a particular manufacturer. The specifications may 
be drafted to ident.ifY a particular article, "or equal," item. On the 
other hand, it is impermissible to tailor the specifications so as to 
confine the field of competition to a single vendor's particular 
product. 27 Maryland state agencies are thus accustomed to the no-
tion that was musically offered thirty years ago by the Rolling 
Stones' MickJagger: "You can't always get what you want, but if you 
try some time, you just might find, you get what you need. "28 
The solicitation must include "specifications," defined as "clear 
and accurate description[s] of the functional characteristics or the 
26. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GoV'T § 15-508 (1999 & Supp. 1999). 
27. See COMAR 21.04.01.02A (providing that it is the "policy of the State that 
specifications be written so as to permit maximum practicable competition 
without modifying the State's requirements"). 
28. The Rolling Stones, You Can't Always Get What You Want, ABKCO (1971). 
1999] Maryland Procurement Law 7 
nature of an item to be procured. "29 The goal is for the State to 
procure goods or services in a cost-effective manner while, at the 
same time, allowing for the maximum practicable competition from 
vendors.30 To ensure that these competing interests are balanced 
fairly, the parties are subject to the procurement laws as well as cer-
tain ethics guidelines mandated by the Maryland General Assembly. 
B. Pre-Solicitation 
Potential contractors with Maryland must abide by the State's 
ethics rules,31 especially the rules contained in sections 15-50832 and 
15-703,33 respectively, of the State Government Article. Prior to 1993, 
a potential vendor who believed the specifications were unduly re-
strictive or otherwise improper could file a bid protest pursuant to 
COMAR 21.10.01; there was little threat of disqualification for the 
vendor who managed to get the specifications tailored for his prod-
ucts. In 1994, the Maryland General Assembly reacted to a trouble-
some practice that had developed among certain state agencies. A 
person, such as a state consultant or potential vendor, could exces-
sively influence the procurement officer to draft the specifications 
in such a way that the employer was "wired" for contract award. 
As indicated in the Report of the "Miller Commission,"34 a per-
son might influence the procurement officer to draft the specifica-
tions so that, as a practical matter, the State would end up buying 
the goods from a particular vendor.35 The Report of the Miller 
Commission gave an example of a consultant who advised the pro-
curement officer on the type of fiber optic cable suitable for the 
State.36 Perhaps unlike the state officers, the consultant knew that 
only his employer could satisfY the unduly restrictive specifications. 
This influence demonstrated the problem where consultants take 
29. COMAR 21.04.01.01. 
30. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FiN. & PROC. § 13-205 (a) (1) (1995 & Supp. 1999); 
COMAR 21.04.01.02A. 
31. See generally MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GoV'T §§ 15-101 to -1001. 
32. See id. § 15-508 (applying to participation in procurement). 
33. See id. § 15-703 (requiring lobbyist registration with the State Ethics Commis-
sion ("Commission"». 
34. See Report of the Joint Task Force on Maryland's Procurement Law, Maryland 
General Assembly (Feb. 1994) (reviewing Maryland procurement laws to de-
termine the proper role of the BPW, state agencies, Maryland General Assem-
bly, and taxpayers in the procurement process). 
35. See id. at 17-18. 
36. See id. at 18 (describing a solicitation for a distance learning network that re-
quired items that could only be met by one vendor). 
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undue advantage of solicitations to create future contract opportu-
nities for themselves. 
In reaction to this problem, the Maryland General Assembly 
enacted section 15-508 of the State Government Article.37 Section 
I5-508(a) provides that: 
[a]n individual who assists an executive unit in the drafting 
of specifications, an invitation for bids, or a request for pro-
posals for a procurement, or a person who employs the in-
dividual may not: (1) submit a bid or proposal for that pro-
curement or; (2) assist another in his submission of a bid.38 
Unfortunately, the statute left unclear and undefined the meaning 
of the verb "assist." There was no guidance in the Code or in any 
regulations to define unethical assistance in the preparation of spec-
ifications, RFPs, or IFBs. Perhaps to aid in the interpretation of this 
provision, the Maryland General Assembly later carved out certain 
exemptions to section I5-508(a) in 1996.39 The exact requirements 
of section 15-508, however, still remain unclear. Vendors and execu-
tive officials seek and receive guidance only from the State Ethics 
Commission (Commission),4O which issues rulings interpreting this 
statute. 
In the context of the procurement process, the objective of the 
Commission is to protect the taxpayers' interests in fair competition 
by making sure that there is no unfair advantage accorded to the 
37. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § IS-50S (regulating participation in procure-
ment). 
3S. [d. § IS-S0S(a) (1)-(2). 
39. See id. § IS-S0S(b). This section provides: 
[d. 
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, assisting in the draft-
ing of specifications, an invitation for bids, or a request for proposals 
for a procurement does not include: (1) providing descriptive litera-
ture such as catalogue sheets, brochures, technical data sheets, or 
standard specification "samples," whether requested by an executive 
agency or provided on an unsolicited basis; (2) submitting written 
comments on a specification prepared by an agency or on a solicita-
tion for a bid or proposal when comments are solicited from two or 
more persons as part of a request for information or a pre bid or 
preproposal process; (3) providing specifications for a sole source 
procurement made in accordance with § 13-107 of the State Finance 
and Procurement Article; or (4) providing architectural and engi-
neering services for programming, master planning, or other project 
planning services. 
40. See id. §§ IS-201 to -210 (pertaining to the Commission). 
1999] Maryland Procurement Law 9 
overzealous or excessively influential potential vendor. The Commis-
sion must balance the efforts of vendors' aggressive sales representa-
tives with the need to protect the State from undue influence. The 
lofty goal of assuring a broad field of competition for satisfying the 
State's minimal needs often puts the procurement officer at odds 
with such representatives. 
The Commission has issued advisory opinions dealing with what 
constitutes assistance by the potential contractor. In one opinion,41 
the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) 
issued a request for a design contractor to review the agency's oper-
ation and to develop a plan to create an Offender Based Manage-
ment Information System for collecting criminal information.42 A 
corporation that subsequently vyed for the contract prescribed oper-
ational and performance requirements for the agency computer sys-
tem and provided a description of the required hardware and 
software for the computer system.43 The Commission concluded that 
this participation constituted assistance pursuant to section IS-S08.44 
The corporation, in essence, created the subsequent procurement 
contract. Therefore, the Commission concluded that section IS-
S0845 precluded the corporation from bidding on the design con-
tract it created.46 
In another advisory opinion concerning section IS-S08, the 
Commission considered the potential disqualification of a consult-
ing firm from the last two phases of a project that involved an 
ongoing procurement with the DPSCS for the design and imple-
mentation of a Master Plan of a Corrections Information System.47 
A consulting firm had conducted a study for DPSCS that resulted in 
a "Blueprint for a Master Plan for the Department" ("Blueprint"), 
which was the first of the three phases in the project.48 The Com-
mission determined that the Blueprint served the same function as 
41. See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 94-9 (Nov. 1, 1994). found in 21 
Md. Reg. 2032 (Nov. 25, 1994). 
42. See id. 
43. See id. at 2032-33. 
44. See id. 
45. At the time of the opinion, this was section 3-110 of the Maryland Public Eth-
ics Law. See id. at 2032. 
46. See id. at 2033. 
47. See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 98-9 (Dec. 9, 1998), found in 26 
Md. Reg. 140, 140 Gan. 15, 1999). 
48. See id. The department was looking to reorganize or "reengineer" its organiza-
tional structure and its formation management systems. See id. 
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the program document in capital projects-it described the antici-
pated organizational and informational structure for the Master 
Plan.49 The Blueprint was a fundamental part of the specifications 
for what was to be procured for the second phase (Le., design) ;50 
therefore, the Commission concluded that the consulting firm 
could not participate in the ongoing procurement due to the prohi-
bition of section 15-508.51 
The Commission also considered how long a consultant's in-
volvement in early stages of a contract affected later involvement.52 
Regarding the consulting firm's involvement in the third phase of 
the project (i.e., implementation), the Commission found that the 
consulting firm could compete.53 The involvement in preparing the 
Blueprint was sufficiendy remote and would not be viewed as having 
assisted in !he specifications for the implementation contract.54 The 
length of time that involvement in the early stage of a project im-
pacts an individual's later involvement is a factual issue.55 The Com-
mission noted that if "the same documents continue to be the sub-
stantial basis for subsequent procurements, then assistance in 
developing the initial documents could be viewed as assistance in 
specification drafting in later procurement actions."56 Here, how-
ever, it appeared that the Blueprint would not be a significant fac-
tor in the implementation of the project.57 Thus, the Commission 
advised that section 15-508 would not bar the consulting firm from 
bidding or participating in the implementation contract, "as long as 
in fact it has no role in the design functions to be carried out by 
the current procurement and the Blueprint it created has been 
largely superseded by the more detailed ongoing design activities. "58 
49. See id. at 141 (detennining that the Blueprint fonned a part of the specifica-
tions for the ongoing procurement). 
50. See id. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. (deciding that section 15-50S would not bar the contractor's participa-
tion in the implementation contract as long as the Blueprint did not playa vi-
tal role in this phase). 
54. See id. 
55. See id. 
56. Id. 
57. See id. (noting that "it appears that the Master Plan design document will in-
clude significantly more detail and specific infonnation only very generally 
suggested by the Blueprint," and adding that if it was detennined that the 
Blueprint had a [ole in later design functions, the decision may be different). 
5S. Id. 
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Although section 15-508 prohibits the excessive influence by 
vendors in some procurement settings, it makes little sense in 
others, such as when the State seeks to procure engineering services 
for a large capital project. In such instances, there are several steps 
to the process. Usually, an engineer is hired to provide a prelimi-
nary conceptual design. If funds are approved by the Maryland 
General Assembly for the project, then there are more detailed 
drawings and specifications for the construction of the project and 
later phases for inspection. The original engineer who designs the 
conceptual, preliminary sketches assists in the procurement of the 
second phase and would necessarily have a competitive advantage. 
Yet, this industry is structured around a single engineer becom-
ing familiar with the project and cost-effectively providing the subse-
quent phases of engineering work. Eventually, through a combina-
tion of legislative and administrative decisions, the Commission 
accommodated this industry. This accommodation is illustrated in a 
1999 ethics opinion. 59 The DGS requested advice regarding an ar-
chitect/ engineering firm that prepared program and preliminary 
schematic designs for a capital construction project for which de-
tailed design services were being procured.60 Later, DGS solicited 
expressions of interest that would be the basis for the selection of a 
designer.61 The program document and preliminary schematic draw-
ings provided the basis for funding requests to the General 
Assembly.62 
The Commission advised that the work performed by the archi-
tect/ engineering firm constituted architectural and engineering ser-
vices that are exempted from the procurement assistance prohibi-
tions in section 15-508 (a), even though the work included some 
schematic drawings.63 The Commission explained that, although the 
documents were mentioned in the RFP and were intended to be a 
starting point for the successful design contractor, the firm's activity 
59. See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 99-1 (Jan. 26, 1999), found in 26 
Md. Reg. 403 (1999). 
60. See id. 
61. See id. 
62. See id. 
63. See id. at 404 (citing MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PRoe. § 15-508(b) (4) (1995 
& Supp. 1999». The Commission distinguished a previous Advisory Opinion, 
No. 98-1. See id. The Commission determined that if the firm actually pre-
pared procurement documents, it was not permitted to bid on the design 
contract. See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 98-1 (Apr. 7, 1998), found 
in 25 Md. Reg. 707, 708 (1998). 
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stopped short of the actual preparation of the bid.64 In 1996, the 
Maryland General Assembly added section IS-S08(b) (4), thereby ex-
pressly enabling these consultants to participate in all phases of the 
procuremen t. 65 
In another opinion,66 the Commission considered a request for 
advice regarding section IS-S08 from a current manager of DGS 
who was responsible for the Energy Performance Contract Pro-
gram.67 The manager was significantly involved in developing the in-
itial Indefinite Delivery Contract (IDC), managing projects devel-
oped under the IDC, and generating RFP materials.68 He was also 
considering leaving the DGS to work for one of the potential ven-
dors for the program.69 In addressing the manager's transfer, the 
Commission applied section IS-S08.70 The Commission ruled that if 
a state employee becomes an employee of a private company, that 
company is excluded from any involvement in bidding on a pro-
curement contract in which the former state employee was 
involved.71 
64. See id. (determining that the firm's work fit within what the legislature in-
tended to be covered as an exception under section 15-50S(b)(4». 
65. For the text of section 15-50S(b) (4), see supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
66. See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 99-5 (Aug. 27, 1999), found in 26 
Md. Reg. 1595 (1999). 
67. See id. 
6S. See id. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. (observing that, although the ethics provision of section IS-50S prima-
rily impacts private individuals and entities involved in defining an agency's 
needs in the context of procurement, state employees involved in RFP prepa-
ration or specifications who then leave to join private entities that are, or ex-
pect to be, involved in submitting a bid or proposal on the procurement 
could also be affected by the ethics provision). 
71. See id. The Commission added that the company is excluded even if the new 
employee does not participate in the bid or proposal. See id. In this opinion, 
the Commission also considered sections 15-501 and 15-504(b) of the State 
Government Article. See id. at 1595-96. Section 15-501 prohibits an employee 
from participating in any matter in which he has an interest or which involves 
an entity with which he is negotiating or has an arrangement regarding pro-
spective employment. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GOV'T § 15-501 (a) (1999 & 
Supp. 1999). The Commission advised that the DGS manager could not par-
ticipate in matters where he has applied for employment with a proposed ven-
dor. See State Ethics Comm'n Advisory op. No. 99-5, found in 26 Md. Reg. at 
1595. The Commission also considered section 15-504(b), which "prohibits a 
former employee from assisting or representing a party other than the State 
in a matter involving the State if the former employee participated signifi-
cantly in the matter as part of his official duties." Id. at 1596 (citing MD. CODE 
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C. Lobbying and Procurement 
There is also a link, again easy to feel but difficult to explain, 
between past abuses in contract award and present procurement 
practices. Maryland has an unfortunate history of abuse by a few of-
ficials. The current statutory regime was developed in response to 
Vice President Spiro Agnew's notorious bribery activity.72 The 1977 
resignation of Secretary of Transportation (and later Governor) 
Harry R. Hughes grew out of alleged tampering by then Governor 
Marvin Mandel who allegedly used political favoritism in awarding 
subway contracts.73 The 1991 award by the Maryland State Lottery 
Agency for On-Line Computer Gaming led to the investigation and 
unrelated federal felony conviction of a prominent lobbyist who 
represented the controversial awardee of the lottery contract.74 In 
1998, the Chairman of the House Economic and Governmental 
Matters Committee resigned in the wake of allegations that he 
wrongfully influenced a state agency to procure insurance services 
from his firm.75 In the same Maryland General Assembly session, the 
ANN., STATE GoV'T § 15-504 (b) ). "Matter" has been interpreted to include any 
proceeding, application, submission, request for ruling, contract, claim, case, 
or other such matter. See id. The Commission determined that the manager 
was significantly involved in the program, in specification drafting, and propo-
sal evaluation. See id. As a result, the manager was barred from assisting any 
vendor in any way on any project that arose from the current or original IDC. 
See id. 
72. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
73. See Smith, supra note 13, at ID; C. Fraser Smith, Lobbyists Duel Over Lottery Con-
tract Tests State Procurement, THE SUN (BALT.), Dec. 23, 1990, at 3J, available in 
1990 WL 4119236 (discussing the history leading up to the passage of Mary-
land procurement law). Governor Mandel was later found guilty of mail fraud 
and racketeering. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1352 (4th Cir. 
1979). Ten years after the conviction and after serving ten months in jail, Gov-
ernor Mandel's convictions were vacated. See United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 
1067, 1068 (4th Cir. 1988). 
74. See C. Fraser Smith, Maker of Lottery Machines is Earning Big Numbers, THE SUN 
(BALT.), June 23, 1991, at El, available in 1991 WL 5882426. The "highest paid 
lobbyist in Annapolis," Bruce Bereano, was hired by the company to win the 
lottery contract. See id. Bereano was subsequently charged with mail fraud as 
a result of his lobbying activities. See United States v. Bereano, 161 F.3d 3, 1998 
WL 553445 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished). Bereano was later disbarred in Ma-
ryland, Washington, D.C., and the Supreme Court. See Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Bereano, 357 Md. 321, 744 A.2d 35 (2000); In re Bereano, 719 A.2d 
98 (D.C. 1998); In re Disbarment of Bereano, 525 U.S. 1119 (1999). 
75. See C. Fraser Smith, Playing Rope-a-Dope with Ethics; Strategy: Despite Three Investi-
gations, the General Assembly has Chosen to Take a Defensive, Rather than Offensive, 
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Senate expelled a senator involved in health care contracting mat~ 
ters because he allegedly abused his position by allegedly forcing a 
state university to procure insurance services from his own agency.76 
These abuses discourage the use of competitive sealed propo~ 
als, causing taxpayers to suffer.77 Properly or not, there is a percep-
tion that subjective criteria for award may invite political influence 
in the selection of the awardee.78 The Maryland General Assembly 
took a step to deal with this concern when it enacted section 15~701 
of the State Government Article, which requires registration, with 
the Commission, of any "executive lobbyist" who seeks to influence 
officials on a procurement contract.79 Unfortunately, those who 
wrongfully corrupt the procurement system seldom register with the 
Commission, and those who properly register seldom corrupt.80 
For attorneys who enter their appearances at the MSBCA on 
behalf of a client, such as a state contractor, it seems unnecessary to 
register as an executive lobbyist. After all, communications with 
MSBCA officials are highly regulated, seldom ex parte, and not 
amenable to the harmful practices which gave rise to the legislative 
registration requirement for those who aim to lobby political ap-
pointees and elected officials. 
Approach in Dealing with the Issue of Ethics, THE SUN (BALT.), Mar. 10, 1998, at 
2B, available in 1998 WL 4955341 (characterizing the legislative session as be-
ing "dominated" by ethics controversies). 
76. See C. Fraser Smith et ai., A Life of Highs, Lows and a Final Fall; His Rapid Rise 
to Power and Stunning Resilience Can't Save Young in the End; SENATE EXPELS 
YOUNG, THE SUN (BALT.), Jan. 17, 1998, at 6A, available in 1998 WL 4947163 
(tracing Larry Young's legislative career up to the Senate's vote to expel him). 
77. See, e.g., David S. Sullivan, Disappointed Bidder Standing to Challenge a Government 
Contract Award: A Proposal For Change in Kentucky Procurement Law, 88 Ky. LJ. 
161, 169 (2000) (conceding that competitive bidding requirements indirectly 
benefit taxpayers); Michael F. Mason, Bid Protests and the U.S. District 
Courts-Why Congress Should Not Allow the Sun to Set on This Effective Relationship, 
26 PUB. CONT. LJ. 567, 588-89 (1997) (splitting the "government contract com-
munity" into two camps, one of which believes that taxpayers and contractors 
possess a valid interest in a procurement system that complies with a strict 
statutory framework). 
78. See Livingston, supra note 7, at 217-18 (discussing Maryland's history of pro-
curement, including awards that were based on subjective criteria). 
79. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T § 15-701 (1999 & Supp. 1999). 
80. See generally Jason D. Kaune, Exporting Ethics: Lessons from Russia's Attempt to Reg-
ulate Federal Lobbying, 20 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 815, 818 (1997); Rob-
ert F. Bauer, Lobby Registration Rules, PLi/CoRP. 103 (1993). 
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III. PROCUREMENT METHODS 
Agencies may use various methods in procuring goods and ser-
vices:81 competitive sealed bidding;82 competitive sealed proposals;83 
noncompetitive negotiation for human, social or educational ser-
vices;84 sole source procurement;85 emergency or expedited procure-
ment;86 small procurement;87 and intergovernmental cooperative 
purchasing.88 State solicitations for goods and services reflect a con-
fluence of interests from several parties. The procurement officer 
brings his professional experience and a real desire to serve his cli-
ent, especially in light of any new requirements by the using agency 
for which the goods and services are purchased. The vendors care 
mostly about what goods and services must be provided and how 
they will get paid. The taxpayers and their legislative representatives 
focus on getting the best value, rather than merely the low bid 
price on the date of contract award. The competing interests of the 
procurement officer, the vendor, and the taxpayer are reflected in 
various decisions of the MSBCA, as outlined below. 
A. Competitive Sealed Bidding 
Competitive sealed bidding is the preferred method of solicita-
tion.89 It is accomplished by the issuance of an IFB. IFBs are used 
by the State when the main criterion for award is low price.90 For 
commodities, such as salt for the highways, stationery, or police 
cars, price is the sole criterion for selection because the IFB estab-
lishes the standards for quality, quantity, and time of delivery. 9 I By 
81. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 13-101 to -323 (1995 & Supp. 1999); 
COMAR 21.03.01.05 (1999). 
82. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103; COMAR 21.05.01.01A. 
83. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 13-104 to -105; COMAR 21. 
05.01.0lB. 
84. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-106; COMAR 21.05.01.01F. 
85. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-107; COMAR 21.05.01.0lD(I). 
86. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-108; COMAR 21.05.01.0lD(2). 
87. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-109; COMAR 21.05.01.01E. 
88. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-110; COMAR 21.05.01.01G. 
89. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-102 (a) (providing that procure-
ment bids shall be made with competitive bidding, unless another type of bid 
is specifically authorized); COMAR 21.05.01.02. 
90. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103 (a)(2) (ii) (stating that an IFB 
must disclose whether the contract will be awarded based on the lowest bid 
price, the lowest evaluated bid price, or, pursuant to section 11-202, the bid 
most favorable to the State). 
91. See COMAR 21.06.03.0lB(2) ("The objective when selecting a contract type is 
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contrast, for procurement of medical services for state employees or 
design services for a building, technical expertise likely outweighs 
the importance of price in selection.92 Practically speaking, the stat-
ute uses IFBs normally for the procurement of goods, where, once 
there is a standard for the types of goods needed, low price is the 
most important factor in source selection. 
1. Notice to Vendors 
The State must furnish public notice of all IFBs where the bid 
amount is reasonably expected to exceed $25,000.93 The public no-
tice requirement is usually fulfilled by publishing notice in the Ma-
ryland Contract Weekly,94 a weekly newsletter alerting potential offer-
ors of state, county, and city solicitations; in the Maryland Register,95 
and beginning in 1999, on the Internet.96 The notice must be pub-
lished at least twenty days prior to the submission of bids to allow 
bidders a reasonable opportunity to formulate their bids.97 There 
must be public notice of bids under $25,000 at least ten days prior 
to submission of bids.98 
2. Pre-Bid Meetings 
Mter IFB issuance, agencies hold a pre-bid meeting pursuant to 
COMAR 21.05.02.07. Notice of the conference is made to all poten-
tial bidders who were sent an IFB or who the procurement officer 
knows received an IFB.99 Agencies can encourage, but cannot re-
quire, attendance at pre-bid meetings. 1oo At the meetings, the pro-
to obtain the best value in the time required and at the lowest cost or price 
or greatest revenue to the State."). 
92. See id. 21.12.02.11B(I)-(6) (listing the general qualification criteria for pro-
curement of architectural and engineering services). 
93. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § l3-103(c)(3) (i); COMAR 21. 
05.02.04B. 
94. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103(c) (3). 
95. See COMAR 21.05.02.04B. 
96. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PRoc. § 13-103(c)(3). By 1999, the Maryland 
Contract Weekly was supplemented by the availability of an on-line service. See 
Contract Weekly Online (last modified Jul. 21, 1999) <http:/ / 
www.sos.state.md.us/sos/dsd/cweekly/html>. As with other states, Maryland 
has made an Internet site available to potential offerors where upcoming con-
tract opportunities are posted. 
97. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103(c) (2). 
98. See id. § 13-103 (c) (3). 
99. See COMAR 21.05.02.07B. 
100. See id. 21.05.02.07D. There is one exception to the non-mandatory nature of 
pre-bid conferences: each solicitation with Minority Business Enterprise 
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curement officer explains the requirements of the IFB.101 The pre-
bid meeting usually provides an opportunity for the procurement 
officer to answer questions of the prospective bidders. In practice, 
competitors are disinclined to ask questions, lest their competition 
get educated as a consequence. State officials' statements at the pre-
bid meeting do not, however, change the requirements of the 
IFB.102 Instead, changes to an IFB may only be made by a written 
amendment authorized by the procurement officer. 103 
3. Amendments to Solicitations 
One aspect of fair treatment in the procurement process is to 
put bidders on equal footing in the competition. Following the ini-
tial solicitation, but prior to the submission of bids or proposals by 
offerors, the procurement officer may issue amendments to a solici-
tation. I04 Amendments are distributed within a reasonable time so as 
to allow prospective bidders ample time to consider the changes to 
the solicitation in preparing their bids.105 The procurement officer 
must send amendments to all potential bidders to whom IFBs were 
sent or to anyone the procurement officer knows obtained the 
IFB.106 Bidders should be diligent. While there is no duty on the 
(MBE) opportunities shall contain a provision requiring bidders or offerors to 
"[a] ttend prebid or other meetings the procurement agency schedules to 
publicize contracting opportunities to MBEs." Id. 21.11.03.09B(2) (b) (v). For 
detailed MBE policies, see MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 14-301 to 
-308; COMAR 21.11.03.01 to .09. Prior to an amendment to COMAR stating 
that attendance at pre-bid meetings was not mandatory, the Attorney General 
opined that a bid or proposal could not be rejected on the ground that the 
offeror failed to attend a pre-bid or pre-proposal meeting, even if the agency 
had designated attendance at the conference to be mandatory. See also 72 Op. 
Md. Att'y Gen. 239 (1987). 
101. See COMAR 21.05.02.07A. 
102. See id. 21.05.02.07D ("Nothing stated at the pre-bid conference may change 
the invitation for bids unless a change is made by the procurement officer by 
written amendment. H ). Even though pre-bid meeting minutes are required, see 
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-21O(a), the minutes may not be con-
sidered to constitute an amendment to the IFB. See Odyssey Contracting Co., 
4 MSBCA 11 317 (1992) (holding that amendments to IFBs may be accom-
plished by addenda only and not by pre-bid meeting minutes); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-2 10 (a) (requiring minutes on conferences 
held for a procurement that is expected to exceed $100,000). 
103. See COMAR 21.05.02.08A. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 21.05.02.08C. 
106. See id. 21.05.02.08B. 
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procuring agency to insure that potential bidders received the 
amendment, failure of a bidder to acknowledge receipt of a mate-
rial addendum usually renders the bid "nonresponsive. "107 
The State wants assurance that the bidders will perform all of 
the work required, including the work set forth in the newly issued 
addendum. It follows that each bidder must expressly indicate that 
it offers to provide the goods and services set forth not only on the 
original solicitation, but also as modified by the amendment. 
So strongly does the State believe in this that it will regularly, 
and summarily, reject any bidder who fails to acknowledge receipt 
of a material addendum. In the short run, it may cost the State 
more money by eliminating an otherwise low bidder's offer. In the 
long run, however, this rejection of bids supports the integrity of 
the procurement process and encourages competition. This rigid 
posture requires bidders, as of bid opening, to demonstrate a clear 
intention to comply with all the contract requirements, including 
those set forth in the amendment. In one example involving the 
Kent Narrows Bridge contract award, the low bidder failed to ac-
knowledge receipt of a material amendment involving $36,000 in 
site utility work. 108 The procurement officer properly rejected the 
low bid as nonresponsive in favor of the second low bidder, whose 
bid was $1,500,000 higher on the approximately $39,000,000 
contract. 109 
If the amendment is material, the bidder must acknowledge its 
receipt of the amendmentYo For example, in Oak lawn Development 
Corp.,111 the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) issued an IFB 
for landscape work and later issued two amendments. The first 
amendment served several purposes, including an increase in the 
quantity of some bid items, substitute bid form sheets, specifications 
for certain items of work, and a new provision pertaining to 
safety.ll2 The second amendment corrected typographical errors of 
the first amendment.ll3 The Appellant failed to acknowledge receipt 
of either amendment and failed to use the bid forms provided by 
107. See Elecuic Motor Indus., 3 MSBCA t 262 at 3 (1990). See also discussion infra 
Part IIIA.6 and text accompanying note 202. 
108. See Conversation of Scott A. Livingston and David A. Bramble of David A. 
Bramble, Inc., on Nov. 10, 1992 (notes on file with the author). 
109. See id. 
110. 2 MSBCA 1: 138 (1986). 
111. See id. at 2. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
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the first amendment. 114 
The MSBCA stated that" [a] bidder's failure to acknowledge a 
material IFB amendment by bid opening renders the bid nonrespon-
sive and thus unacceptable since, absent such an acknowledgment, 
the government's acceptance of the bid would not legally obligate 
the bidder to meet the government's needs as identified in the 
amendment."115 "Material" criteria usually include price, quantity, 
quality, and time of delivery.1l6 The MSBCA also observed that 
whenever a bidder "does not acknowledge an amendment imposing 
new legal obligations [the bidder] may be viewed as attempting ... 
to reserve to itself an election after bid opening to speak up and 
agree to perform the added requirements or stand silent and let its 
bid be rejected as nonresponsive. "117 It would undermine the integ-
rity of the procurement process if a bidder, whether shrewdly or 
mistakenly, had the opportunity to opt in or out of a contract award 
after the other bid prices were revealed. 118 
If the amendment is not material, however, the bidder need 
not acknowledge it. 119 In a rather early case, Liberty Rnofing Co., DGS 
issued an IFB for roofing work at Morgan State University.120 A dis-
appointed bidder protested the award of the contract to the low 
bidder who failed to, among other things, acknowledge receipt of 
an amendment to the IFB that imposed a less strict specification 
standard. 121 The amendment made performance of the work less 
expensive. 122 
The MSBCA denied the protest and held that acknowledgment 
of the amendment was not necessary because the amendment re-
laxed the specifications and resulted in a decreased cost of perform-
114. See id. at 3. 
115. Id. at 5. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 6. 
118. See COMAR 21.05.02.11 (providing that bids shall be opened publicly, there-
fore allowing all bidders to know their competitors' bid prices). 
119. See Liberty Roofing Co., 1 MSBCA 1 77, at 7 (1984) (determining that in such 
circumstances, there is no prejudice to other bidders); see also Baltimore Mo-
tor Coach Co., 1 MSBCA 1 94 (1985) ("[F]ailure to acknowledge an adden-
dum in a negotiated procurement necessarily does not preclude consideration 
of the affected proposal and the omission properly may be made the subject 
of later discussions and negotiations."). 
120. 1 MSBCA 1 77, at 2. 
121. See id. at 7. 
122. See id. 
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ance to the contractor. 123 According to the MSBCA: "Under such 
circumstances, there is no prejudice that can result to other bidders 
by acceptance of the otherwise low "responsive" bid based on origi-
nal specifications that are more onerous than the specifications as 
amended." 124 
4. Pre-Bid Explanations 
In preparing bids and proposals, potential vendors frequently 
contact the procurement officer or an authorized representative for 
more information about the contract opportunity. The procurement 
officer is generally accessible to the potential contractors and the 
procurement officer's name and phone number are usually in-
cluded in the RFP or IFB. This accessibility often leads potential 
contractors to call the procurement officer when a question or 
problem arises in the preparation of a bid or proposal. Potential 
contractors, however, should seldom rely on such oral information; 
oral pre-bid interpretations are not binding on the State. 125 
In many ways, procurement of goods and services by the state 
differs from traditional purchasing in the private arena; this incon-
sistency is well-illustrated in the area of pre-bid oral communica-
tions with state officials. In the private sector, the potential vendor 
talks frequently with the customer. The parties negotiate until the 
product offered suits the customer's tastes and budget. These com-
munications between the potential buyer and seller are reasonable 
given that the potential customer owes no duties, legal or otherwise, 
to keep other potential vendors on equal footing. 
In contrast, the procurement officers spend public funds and 
the rules are different. The Maryland General Assembly has deter-
mined that potential vendors should be on roughly equal footing in 
competing for state procurement contracts. 126 Therefore, any pre-
123. See id. 
124. Id. The MSBCA waived the failure to acknowledge the amendment as a minor 
irregularity. For a discussion of minor irregularities in bids, see infra notes 
225-28 and accompanying text. 
125. See infra notes 126-60 and accompanying text. 
126. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-201 (a) (2) (1995 & Supp. 1999) 
(listing one of the purposes of the procurement regulations as "ensuring fair 
and equitable treatment of all person[s] who deal with the State procurement 
system"); see also Capitol Dental Supply, Inc., 2 MSBCA 1 161, at 4 (1987) (re-
stating the "equal footing" requirement in Maryland procurement law); J&L 
Indus., 1 MSBCA'lI 98, at 5-6 (1985); Granite Constr. Co., 1 MSBCA'I 8, at 8-9 
(1981) (labeling "equal information for all bidders [as] an essential feature of 
the competitive bid process"). 
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bid explanation offered by the procurement officer to a single ven-
dor cannot reasonably bind the procurement officer or the State. 127 
The reason is simple: it is unfair for the procurement officer to tell 
one favored vendor certain information when the other vendors 
would not know that same information. It might give one vendor an 
unfair competitive advantage over the other vendors and would cer-
tainly give an appearance of favoritism by the state official to a par-
ticular vendor. For newcomers to the procurement system, it seems 
odd that the potential vendor cannot rely on the tIuthfulness of the 
procurement officer's oral explanation to bind the state. It is among 
the numerous anomalies that justify characterizing the procurement 
system as "Byzantine." In the narrow context of procurement law, 
this ruling is logical in order to give the public and contractors con-
fidence in the integrity of the procurement system.128 
One landmark case established that pre-bid oral statements do 
not bind the State. 129 In Granite Construction CO.,130 the MTA issued 
an IFB for the constIuction of a certain stIucture and tunnel associ-
ated with Baltimore's public transportation system. 131 In preparing 
its bid, the appellant's chief estimator was uncertain whether the 
potential contractor would be required to relocate gas mains.132 The 
chief estimator telephoned the MTA and spoke with the project en-
gineer,133 who ultimately told the chief estimator that the contractor 
would not be responsible for relocating the gas mains. 134 The appel-
lant prepared its bid accordingly.135 During the life of the contract, 
the MTA informed the appellant that it would have to relocate the 
127. See Granite Constr. Co., 1 MSBCA at 8 (reiterating that oral instructions or clari-
fications are not binding unless offered at a conference to which the bidders 
were invited). 
128. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-201 (a)(3) (listing one of the pur-
poses of the procurement system as "providing safeguards for maintaining a 
State procurement system of quality and integrity"). 
129. See Granite Constr. Co., 1 MSBCA t 8 (1991), afl'd, Mass Transit v. Granite 
Constr. Co., 57 Md. App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984). 
130. 1 MSBCA t 8 (1981), afl'd, Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Constr. Co., 57 Md. 
App. 766, 471 A.2d 1121 (1984). For a discussion of other repercussions in 
Maryland procurement law as a result of the court of special appeals case, see 
Livingston, supra note 7, at 23940. 
131. See Granite Constr. Co., 1 MSBCA at 2. 
132. See id. at 6. 
133. See id. (describing the information sought and received by the estimator). 
134. See id. 
135. See id. (explaining that the estimator prepared a bid that did not include the 
gas main relocation). 
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gas mains. 136 The MTA denied appellant's claim for an equitable ad-
justment for the additional costs incurred for the relocation of the 
gas mains. 137 
The MSBCA determined that the appellant could not recover 
for the additional costs for several reasons. 138 The IFB contained a 
provision that oral explanations to bidders would not be binding on 
the MTA. 139 The MSBCA also indicated that the MTA was not es-
topped from repudiating the clarification given by the MTA's pro-
ject engineer. l40 Under Maryland law, the party claiming estoppel 
must "show that it had a clear right to rely upon the clarification is-
sued."141 The appellant had no right to rely on the statement by the 
MTA's project engineer, so the MTA could not be estopped by his 
action.142 
While the rule that a bidder may not rely on a clarification pro-
vided by an employee of the procuring agency may seem unfair, it 
is actually more equitable to all bidders. In Capitol Dental Supply, 
Inc.,143 the DGS solicited bids for dental equipment, including den-
tal chairs with a hydraulic base. l44 The manager of one bidder, Dee-
ley Dental Supply Company ("Deeley"), called the DGS buyer re-
sponsible for the procurement to ask whether dental chairs with an 
electromechanical base, as opposed to a hydraulic base, would be 
acceptable. 145 The DGS buyer advised the manager that such chairs 
would be acceptable, but did not communicate his alleged approval 
to the procurement officer or to other prospective bidders.l46 Of 
the bidders, only Deeley submitted a bid for chairs with elec-
136. See id. 
137. See id. at 7. 
138. See id. at 8-11. 
139. See id. at 8. 
140. See id. at 10. 
141. Id. (citing Anne Arundel County v. Whitehall Venture, 39 Md. App. 197, 205, 
384 A.2d 780, 786 (1978». 
142. See id. at 11 (determining that the appellant's reliance on an oral clarification, 
rather than seeking an addendum, constituted a lack of diligence); see also 
Concrete General, Inc., 1 MSBCA 1: 87, at 14 (1984) (holding that an agency 
employee with no authority to act contractually on behalf of the agency could 
not bind the agency by his interpretation of the contract in the absence of 
clear evidence which would impute the employee's knowledge to an author-
ized official of the agency). 
143. 2 MSBCA 'lI 161 (1987). 
144. See id. at 2. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. 
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tromechanical bases. 147 The price difference between hydraulic and 
electromechanical chairs made Deeley the low bidderl4s and DGS 
was poised to recommend Deeley for contract award. 149 
The second low bidder filed a bid protest challenging the 
award of the contract to Deeley,150 claiming that the low vendor's 
bid was non-responsive. 151 The DGS decided that, despite contract 
language requiring a hydraulic base chair, Deeley's electromechani-
cal base chair met the minimal needs of the agency.152 DGS also ar-
gued that the second low bidder, like Deeley, could have contacted 
DGS prior to bid opening to determine whether DGS would accept 
a dental chair with a non-hydraulic base. 153 
The MSBCA stated "Maryland procurement law requires that 
bidders compete on an equal footing, and that one bidder not be 
accorded a competitive advantage to the prejudice of the other bid-
ders by the action of the State. "154 Therefore, Deeley was not per-
mitted to offer a type of dental chair that did not meet the specifi-
cations of the IFB.155 Its bid was rejected as nonresponsive. 156 The 
MSBCA also noted that it was irrelevant that competitors could have 
contacted DGS about acceptance of other types of chairs.157 The 
pre-bid communication with the DGS employee was not authorized 
and Deeley had no right to rely on any representation that was 
made by the employee. 15S The MSBCA further elaborated that the 
procurement officer and the agency head, not the DGS employee 
involved, were ultimately responsible for the content, clarity, and 
completeness of the specifications. 159 From this discussion, it is clear 
147. See id. at 3. The MSBCA noted that Deeley submitted an alternate bid that in-
cluded a hydraulic base, but that it was refused by DGS pursuant to COMAR 
21.05.02.21. See id at 2 n.2. 
148. See id. at 3. 
149. See id. (indicating that the DGS had reversed its earlier determination that 
Deeley's bid was nonresponsive). For a discussion of the procedural aspects of 
contract award, see infra notes 251-57 and accompanying text. 
150. See Capitol Dental Supply, Inc., 2 MSBCA at 3. For a discussion of bid protests, 
see infra Part IV. 
151. See Capitol Dental Supply, Inc., 2 MSBCA at 3. For a discussion of the respon-
siveness of bidders, see infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text. 
152. See Capitol Dental Supply Inc., 2 MSBCA at 3. 
153. See id. at 4. 
154. Id. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. 
159. See id.; see also COMAR 21.04.01.04 (1999) (providing that the procurement of-
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that Maryland law mandates that any material change to the IFB re-
sulting from a pre-bid inquiry must be communicated to all other 
prospective bidders in the form of a written amendment to the IFB 
before it can be relied upon when completing a bid. l60 
5. Evaluation and Award 
Competitive sealed bidding contemplates award to the "respon-
sible" and "responsive" 161 bidder who meets the bid requirements 
and the evaluation criteria set forth in the solicitation and submits 
the most favorable bid price or the most favorable evaluated bid 
price. 162 Bids must be evaluated exclusively on the objective evalua-
tion criteria set forth in the IFB.163 The requirement of "objective 
criteria" means that the criteria must be made known to, or ascer-
tainable by, the bidder at the time his bid is being prepared. l64 
There are at least two strong reasons why the specifications 
should clearly identify the basis upon which the offeror's bid propo-
sal will be evaluated. First, it allows the field of competing vendors 
to understand what the State really wants based on the stated fac-
tors it will use to choose the awardee. Vendors should compete 
based on ingenuity and creativity, not "inside information," to pro-
vide the best product or services necessary to satisfy the govern-
ment's needs. Most vendors will pursue contracts that fall into their 
particular niche, and obviously, this serves the State's interest as 
well. 
Second, it is unfair for the government to apply some mysteri-
ous or unstated criterion in the selection of the contractor. Where 
the parties provide essentially the same services, usually price gov-
erns the selection. If there are big differences in technical ap-
proaches to serving the State's needs, the criteria for selection 
should be well known so that the potential awardees will understand 
that their proposals are judged on the merits~ It is disheartening for 
flcer is responsible for reviewing the specifications). 
160. See COMAR 21.05.02.08; see also Odyssey Contracting Co., 4 MSBCA 1 317 
(1992) (stating that amendments to IFBs may be accomplished by addenda 
only and not by pre-bid meeting minutes). 
161. For a discussion of "responsiveness" and "responsibility," see infra section 
III.A.6 and accompanying text. 
162. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-103(e) (1995 & Supp. 1999); 
COMAR 21.05.02.13A. 
163. See COMAR 21.05.02.13A, .13B ("Only objectively measurable criteria which 
are set forth in the invitation for bids shall be applied in determining the 
most favorable evaluated bid price."). 
164. See Neoplan USA Corp., 1 MSBCA 1 76, at 23-24 (1984) (citations omitted). 
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a vendor to spend thousands of dollars developing a proposal, only 
to learn that the State eventually decided to pick the awardee based 
on some trivial consideration. 
In PTC Corp. & Ion Track Instruments, Inc.,165 the DGS issued an 
IFB for drug and explosive detection devices. l66 In error, an older 
specification was used in the IFB.167 Instead of specifying that at 
least thirty substances be simultaneously detectable by the devices, 
the specification required devices that detected only fifteen. 168 In re-
jecting the low bid, the procurement officer stated that bidders de-
vices were nonresponsive to the needs of the requesting agency-not 
that the devices were nonresponsive to the specifications. 169 
Although not outcome-determinative,170 the MSBCA stated that 
the agency did not evaluate the bids according to the specifications 
in the IFB but, rather, according to the more stringent specifica-
tions that should have been listed in the IFB.171 The MSBCA con-
cluded that a bid should be evaluated based upon the responsive-
ness of the bid to the specifications in the IFB, not the unstated or 
unidentified needs of the procuring agency.172 
6. Responsible Versus Responsive 
The State should not award contracts to bidders whose 
promises to perform are not credible, or whose promises fall short 
of the State's requirements. Award of a contract is to be made to 
the "responsible and responsive bidder" whose bid meets the re-
quirements set forth in the IFB and whose bid is the lowest bid 
165. 5 MSBCA'I 430 (1998). 
166. See id. at 2. 
167. See id. at 3. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. at 3-4. 
170. The MSBCA determined it did not have jurisdiction to consider this appeal 
based on the untimeliness of the bid protest. See id. at 6. Because the MSBCA 
had to hear evidence to determine the close question of timeliness, however, 
the MSBCA offered its insights regarding the substantive failings of the evalua-
tion of the bids. See id. (clarifYing that the solicitation at issue should not 
serve as a model under procurement law). 
171. See id. 
172. See id. at 7; see also JTE Contractors, Inc., 5 MSBCA 1 391, at 4 (1996) (deter-
mining that it is improper to make an award baSed on a change in the IFB 
requirements that occurs after bid opening and prior to award); Honeywell, 
Inc., 2 MSBCA, 148, at 10 (1987) (" [I]t is fundamental that an agency may 
not solicit quotations on one basis and then make award on another basis."). 
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price or the lowest evaluated bid price. 173 According to Maryland 
regulations: "'Responsible' means a person who has the capability 
in all respects to perform fully the contract requirements, and the 
integrity and reliability that shall assure good faith performance. "174 
In other words, responsibility encompasses a bidder's capability to 
fulfill the terms of the contract. 175 
The procurement officer is accorded broad discretion in mea-
suring the responsibility of a bidder. Mter all, the procurement of-
ficer will be in the direct position to enjoy or endure the vendor's 
performance. If the offeror's promises to perform are not credi-
ble-perhaps because his past promises have not proven credible-
then the procurement officer is free to reject the bidder. It is a 
grave determination and one that dramatically affects a business's 
ability to receive contracts with the State from that point forward. It 
is not as serious as determining that the bidder should be "debar-
red" 176-denied the property right to obtain state contracts. Never-
theless, a determination of "non-responsibility" can seriously under-
mine a bidder's potential for competing for future contracts. 
Where the government procurement officer determines the 
bidder is responsible, it is seldom reversible by the MSBCA in any 
bid -protest appeal. 177 There is a good reason for this. The MSBCA 
does not serve as a "super" procurement officer. 178 It is mainly the 
procurement officer who will suffer harm if the bidder proves to be 
incapable of performing in accordance with its promises. As set 
forth in H.A. Hams,179 the procurement officer makes these deter-
173. COMAR 21.05.02.13A (1999); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-
103(e) (1) (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
174. COMAR 21.01.02.01(77). 
175. See Covington Machine & Welding Co., 5 MSBCA'I 436, at 7 (1998). 
176. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 16-101 to -203 (providing for suspen-
sion and debannent of contractors). 
177. In accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, see COMAR 21.10.07.01 
to .09, the MSBCA "will not disturb the procurement officer's detennination 
regarding responsibility unless the detennination was arbitrary, capricious, or 
clearly erroneous." Covington Machine & Welding Co., 5 MSBCA at 5. 
178. The MSBCA is a statutorily-created body, having only the powers granted it by 
statute. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 15-205 to -212 (1995 & Supp . 
.1999); COMAR 21.02.02.01 to .03. The MSBCA has retained its proper role, 
perhaps due to the wise chainnanship and membership of Robert K. Harri-
son, III, whose deft allegiance to the State Finance and Procurement Article 
and the Administrative Procedures Act has restrained the MSBCA. See MD. 
CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 15-201 to -214; -216; MD. CODE ANN., STATE 
Govr. §§ 10-101 to -305. 
179. 2 MSBCA 1: 193 (1988). In this decision, the Maryland Port Administration 
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minations in the officer's capacity of carrying out duties delegated 
by the secretary of the department. lso For this reason, the secretary 
of the department, who serves at the pleasure of the governor, may 
properly direct the procurement officer how to determine bidder 
responsibility. By comparison, in the federal sector, such "command 
influence" on the independent contracting officer might render the 
contract award invalid. lSI This friction demonstrates that the lofty 
goal, as set forth in section 11-201 (a) (3) of the Procurement Article 
and COMAR 21.01.01.03F, of providing safeguards for maintaining a 
state procurement system of quality and integrity sometimes yields 
to a rougher form of justice when applied to particular facts. 
The procurement officer's determination of bidder responsibil-
ity involves a forecast of the contractor's probable ability to perform 
the contract and is a matter of judgment which is to be based on 
fact and reached in good faith.IS2 The procurement officer should 
consider information such as work experience and ability.ls3 Infor-
mation concerning bidder responsibility may be submitted after bid 
(MPA) issued an RFP for certain construction work with one of the RFP pro-
visions requiring the contractor to perform 25% of the work itself. See id. at 2-
3. The procurement officer conducted a pre-award survey meeting and ques-
tioned the low bidder, about what percentage of the work it would do itself. 
See id. at 3. The low bidder relayed that it would only perform 14% of the 
contract work. See id. The procurement officer recommended that the low 
bidder not be awarded the contract. See id. The procurement officer then no-
tified the low bidder it would not be awarded the contract. See id. at 6. Subse-
quent to the notification by the procurement officer, the low bidder sent a 
second letter stating that it would do 26% of the contract work. See id. In ad-
dition, the low bidder requested a meeting with the Secretary of MDOT. See 
id. Based on the Secretary's instructions, MPA awarded the contract to the low 
bidder. See id. at 7. The second low bidder protested, claiming the Secretary 
wrongfully influenced the procurement officer's independent judgment. See 
id. at 8. The MSBCA held that "command influence" was not an issue be-
cause the procurement officer's decision had not been usurped by a higher 
authority. See id. at 19. What happened, instead, was the procurement officer's 
decision had been overruled by the Secretary, who was exercising his own au-
thority. See id. 
180. See id. at 19. 
181. See generally 48 C.F.R § 1.602-2(b) (1999) ("Contracting officers shall ... 
[e]nsure that contractors receive impartial, fair, and equitable treatment."); 
Joel P. Shedd, Principles of Authority on Contracting Officers in Administration of 
Government Contracts, 5 PUB. CONT. LJ. 88, 110-11 (1972) (discussing the inva-
lidity of a contracting officer's actions when coerced by a higher authority). 
182. See Covington Machine & Welding Co., 5 MSBCA'I 436, at 5 (1998) (citing 
Charles Center Properties, 3 MSBCA'I 297, at 8-9 (1992». 
183. See id. at 5-6. 
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opening. 184 
In making a determination of responsibility, the procurement 
officer may consider whether the bidder: (1) has been in a particu-
lar business for a certain number of years;185 (2) holds certain certi-
fications;186 (3) provides an executed debarment affidavit with its 
bid;'87 (4) has the appropriate or comparable experience to per-
form the work;188 (5) has performed poorly on past contracts with 
the state;189 (6) has the required licenses to perform the work;l90 
and (7) possesses the appropriate technical staffing. 191 
Integrity is not the only factor relevant to a determination of 
bidder responsibility. In James Julian, Inc.,'92 the second low bidder 
claimed that the apparent low bidder's bid was "materially unbal-
anced"'93 and should be rejected as non-responsible. The second 
low bidder argued that its bid should be accepted. '94 The procure-
ment officer denied its protest. 195 The MSBCA decided that a pro-
curement officer may reject an unbalanced bid on the basis of re-
sponsibility, but only if the bidder's capability to perform is 
184. See id. at 7 (citing National Elevator Co., 2 MSBCA 'lI 114, at 4 (1985». 
185. See Independent Testing Agency, Inc., 4 MSBCA , 369, at 8 (1994) (noting 
that the experience of corporate officers could be considered in determining 
the "time in business" requirement); Calloway'S Air Conditioning & Remodel-
ing, 3 MSBCA'lI 202, at 4-5 (1989) (stating that a procurement officer may 
consider the work experience of the company's officers and employees to es-
tablish the required minimum work or skill requirements of a company). 
186. See Independent Testing Agency, 4 MSBCA at 8. 
187. See DeBarros Constr. Corp., 3 MSBCA, 215, at 3 (1989) (declaring that lack 
of certificates and affidavits have a bearing on bidder responsibility, not re-
sponsiveness) . 
188. See Environmental Controls, Inc., 2 MSBCA 1 168, at 5 (1987) (stating that the 
procurement officer may consider a corporate official's experience in making 
a responsibility determination). 
189. See id. at 6 (finding that the procurement officer's non-responsibility determi-
nation was warranted due to past poor performance of the bidder). 
190. See Civic Center Cleaning Co., 2 MSBCA 1 169, at 7 (1988) (agreeing with the 
DGS that where certain licenses are necessary, and the bidder does not have 
them, the bidder can be deemed non-responsible). 
191. See Maryland New Directions, Inc., 2 MSBCA 'I 179, at 1 (1988) ("Where the 
services to be provided under the proposed contract are personal services ... , 
it is reasonable for evaluators to look at those employees who will perform 
the service to help establish that the offeror meets the minimum qualifica-
tions for the responsibility determination."). 
192. 3 MSBCA'lI 245 (1990). 
193. Id. 
194. See id. at 2. 
195. See id. at 3. 
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adversely affected by any advance payment by the State. 196 
In Civic Center Cleaning CO.,197 the IFB required bidders to sub-
mit the appropriate licenses with their bids. 198 The apparent low 
bidder did not submit copies of its licenses with its bid and a pro-
tester claimed that failure to include such licenses made the bid 
nonresponsive. l99 The MSBCA concluded that the licenses were nec-
essary to determine the capability of the bidder and constituted a 
question of responsibility, not responsiveness.2OO Because the licenses 
were on file with the procuring agency, the procurement officer de-
termined that the apparent low bidder was responsible and the 
MSBCA agreed with that decision.201 
In contrast to responsibility, '''[r]esponsive' means a bid sub-
mitted in response to an invitation for bids that conforms in all ma-
terial respects to the requirements contained in the invitation for 
bids. "202 It should be further noted that: "a matter of responsibility 
'cannot be made into a question of responsiveness by the terms of 
the solicitation.' "203 Unlike bidder responsibility, bid responsiveness 
must be determined as of bid opening and must be evaluated from 
the face of the bid documents, "not from any information subse-
quently gathered in a verification process or through other extrinsic 
evidence."204 
The determination of bid responsiveness is left to agency dis-
cretion and is only overcome by a showing that the procuring 
agency's decision is clearly erroneous.20S The MSBCA is more defer-
196. See id. at 7. 
197. 2 MSBCA t 169 (1988). 
198. See id. at 2. 
199. See id. at 7. 
200. See id. 
201. See id. at 7-8 (finding that the procurement officer acted within his discretion 
in considering the licenses on file in making a determination of responsibil-
ity). 
202. COMAR 21.01.02.01(78) (1999). See Covington Machine & Welding Co., 5 
MSBCA t 436, at 7 (1998). 
203. Cuuington Machine & Welding Co., 5 MSBCA at 7. (quoting National Elevator 
Co., 2 MSBCA, 151, at 4 (1985»; accord Independent Testing Agency, Inc., 4 
MSBCA t 369, at 9 (1994); Cam Constr. Co. of Md., 2 MSBCA t 195, at 9 
(1988). 
204. AEPCO, Inc., 5 MSBCA 1. 415, at 5 (1997) (citations omitted). 
205. See A1tek Corp., 4 MSBCA t 337, at 5 (1993) (adding that the appellant has 
the burden of demonstrating that the procurement officer's technical judg-
ment is clearly erroneous); Packard Instrument Co., 2 MSBCA 1. 125, at 8 
(1986) (concluding that the appellant did not show that the procurement of-
fice's determination was erroneous). 
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ential to the procurement officer's determination of responsibility 
than to his determination of legal responsiveness. Items that bear 
upon bid responsiveness include whether: (1) the bidder acknowl-
edged receipt of material amendments to the solicitation;206 (2) the 
bid is ambiguous;207 (3) the bidder's bid bond contains material de-
fects;208 (4) the bid was submitted in the appropriate envelope;209 
(5) the bid was submitted with bid samples required by the IFB;210 
(6) a product submitted as "an equal" to the IFB specifications 
meets the enumerated characteristics set forth in the IFB;211 (7) the 
bidder committed to a Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) goal;212 
and (8) the requirement that the bid include the names of employ-
ees with certain certifications.213 
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that, 
"[mlen must turn square corners when they deal with the Govern-
ment. "214 This remains basically true today. Those vendors who wish 
206. See Apex Environmental, Inc., 5 MSBCA'I 422, at 11 (1997) ("A bidder's fail-
ure to acknowledge receipt of a material amendment renders its bid 
nonresponsive." (citing Oaklawn Dev't Corp., 2 MSBCA'I 138 (1986»). 
207. See Porter Constr. Mgmt., Inc., 5 MSBCA , 414, at 4 (1997) (holding that an 
ambiguous bid must be rejected as nonresponsive). 
208. See Keller Bros./ Accubid Excavation Joint Venture, 5 MSBCA 'I 395, at 4 
(1996) (rejecting the appellant'S bid as nonresponsive because the bid bond 
provided did not contain the substantive requirements of the agency bid 
bond form); Cornn & Gatch, Inc., I MSBCA'I 240, at 4 (1990) (upholding 
the procurement officer's decision to reject the appellant'S bid as nonrespon-
sive because the bid bond did not contain the penal sum amount); see also 
MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & !'ROC. § 13-207 (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
209. See Civic Center Cleaning Co., 2 MSBCA 'I 169, at 7 (1988) (holding that 
deviation from the requirement that bids be submitted in preprinted blue en-
velopes was a matter of responsiveness, but the deviation was waived as a mi-
nor irregularity pursuant to COMAR 21.05.02.12A and 21.06.02.03). 
210. See Merjo Adver. & Sales Promotion Co., 5 MSBCA, 393, at 4 (1996) (holding 
that samples must be submitted with the bid, because "information . . . 
outside the bid may not be considered" in determining whether a bid is re-
sponsive); see also H.L. Frey Corp., 5 MSBCA, 435, at 4 (1998). 
211. See Rockville Partitions, Inc., 4 MSBCA, 367, at 3 (1994); see also Automated 
Telecomm., Inc., I MSBCA , 219, at 6-8 (1989) (clarifying the brand name 
"or equal" requirement). 
212. See Gladwynne Constr. Co., 5 MSBCA, 390, at 3 (1996) (concluding that fail-
ure to commit to the proper MBE goal is not waivable as a "minor irregular-
ity"); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14-301 (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
213. See Substation Test Co., 5 MSBCA, 429, at 1 (1997) (holding that a low bid-
der that did not provide its employees' certifications had failed to comply 
with a material requirement of the solicitation). 
214. Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920). 
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to be awarded contracts must "turn square corners" in the sense 
that the bid must strictly conform to the material requirements. 
The term material is slightly flexible.215 It would be impossible for 
the State to codify, in advance, every single type of non-conformity 
that would be deemed material. Under the common-law tradition, 
the broad concept of responsiveness is applied to various factual sit-
uations. As a practical matter, whatever the MSBCA says is material 
is material and not otherwise. 
7. Mistakes in Bids 
Occasionally, there are mistakes in a bid submitted to the State. 
Maryland procurement law has a low tolerance for mistakes in bids. 
COMAR identifies the rules to follow when there are mistakes in a 
bid.216 For instance, if a bidder discovers a mistake in its bid prior 
to bid opening, it may withdraw or correct the bid.217 If a mistake is 
discovered after award of the contract, correction of the bid is not 
permitted unless the procurement officer and the agency head de-
termine that it would be unconscionable not to allow the mistake to 
be corrected.218 Even so, changes in bid price are not allowed.219 
Consistent with the rough form of justice noticeable in pro-
curement practice, there is a good reason that a party who submits 
a mistake in its bid will seldomly be excused. From some abstract 
point of view, when an offeror offers to perform work, the of-
feree-the State-should have the power of acceptance. This no-
tion, however, yields to the equitable belief that the offeree should 
not be allowed to snap up an improvident offer.220 
In the procurement law arena, state officials face difficulties 
when a mistakenly low bid is accepted and the contractor fails to 
perform because of the unfortunately low price. The government 
may end up terminating the contractor for default and incur excess 
procurement costs to hire a follow-on contractor unless a surety per-
forms the work. Likewise, the reasonable bidder who offered the 
second lowest bid price is hardly benefitted by watching one of his 
imprudent competitors go bankrupt. It is usually better if the con-
215. For a discussion of materiality, see supra notes 107-18 and accompanying text. 
216. See COMAR 21.05.02.12 (1999). 
217. See id. 21.05.02. 12B. 
218. See id. 21.05.02. 12D. 
219. See id. 
220. See Mayor of Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 527, 124 
A.2d 557, 562 (1956) (recognizing that when an offeror accepts a bid fully 
aware that it is a mistake, it cannot hold the offeree to a binding contract). 
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tract is awarded to the second lowest bidder, and the low bidder's 
improvident offer merely withdrawn. State agencies should guard 
against the practice of submitting a deliberately low bid, with the 
unscrupulous bidder reckoning he can claim mistake if, upon dis-
closure of the other bids, he concludes his bid was too low. Eventu-
ally, such a bidder should be subject to a determination of non-
responsibility or perhaps even debarment in extreme cases.221 
The procurement regulations allow the procurement officer to 
request a bid confirmation from a bidder if the procurement officer 
knows or has reason to believe that a mistake in a bid has oc-
curred.222 The procurement officer should request confirmation of a 
bid when the bid includes obvious errors or a bid is "unreasonably 
lower" than other bids. 223 If, after confirmation is requested, a bid-
der alleges a mistake in its bid, the bidder may be allowed to with-
draw the bid under certain circumstarJces.224 
Even if a mistake in a bid occurs, the mistake may be waived by 
the procurement officer if the mistake constitutes a "minor irregu-
larity. "225 Under Maryland procurement law: 
A minor irregularity is one which is merely a matter of 
form and not of substarJce or pertains to some immaterial 
or inconsequential defect or variation in a bid or proposal 
from the exact requirement of the solicitation, the correc-
tion or waiver of which would not be prejudicial to other 
bidders or offerors. 226 
A defect is immaterial "when its significance as to price, quantity, 
quality, or delivery is trivial or negligible when contrasted with the 
221. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 16-101 (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
222. See COMAR 21.05.02.12C (listing situations where confinnation should be re-
quested, including "obvious, apparent errors on the face of the bid or a bid 
unreasonably lower than the other bids submitted"). 
223. Id. 21.05.02. 12C. 
224. A bid may not be withdrawn after bid opening if the "mistake and intended 
correction are clearly evident on the face of the bid document." Id. 
21.05.02.12C(I). In this case, the bid shall be corrected. See id. On the other 
hand, a bidder may withdraw its bid after bid opening if "(a) [a] mistake is 
clearly evident on the face of the bid document but the intended correct bid 
is not similarly evident; or (b) [t]he bidder submits proof of evidential value 
which clearly and convincingly demonstrates that a mistake was made." Id. 
21.05.02.12(2). 
225. Id. 21.05.02.12A. 
226. Id. 21.06.02.04A. 
1999] Maryland Procurement Law 33 
total cost or scope of the procurement. "227 When a minor irregular-
ity is discovered, the bidder has the opportunity to cure the defect 
or the procurement officer may waive the deficiency-whichever is 
most advantageous to the State.228 
The MSBCA has considered several appeals concerning mis-
takes in bids and the waiver of minor irregularities. In Dick Corp.,229 
the MTA issued an IFB for construction work on the Baltimore Har-
bor TunneI.23o The procurement officer discovered that the low bid-
der's line items totaled approximately $400,000 less than the total 
amount that had been written in words at the bottom of the bid 
document.231 The MSBCA stated that the low bidder could not in-
crease its bid by $400,000.232 While the mistake was readily apparent 
from the face of the bid, the intended correction was not clearly ap-
parent from examination of the bid documents.233 It was only 
through extrinsic evidence that the correct bid amount became 
known.234 This ruling correctly recognized that if bidders could rely 
on extrinsic evidence, such as an estimator's worksheets, to justify 
changes in bids after the other prices are revealed, this might lead 
to harmful practices and decreased public confidence in the state 
procurement process. 
Likewise, in Madigan Construction CO.,235 the bidder submitted a 
bid bond that designated an improper obligee and provided that 
the bid could be extended without notice to the surety for only 
sixty days, whereas the IFB required ninety days.236 The appellant ar-
gued that the mistake was apparent, the result of a clerical error, 
and that it should be allowed to correct the deficiency.237 The appel-
lant also argued that the mistake was a minor irregularity that could 
be waived by the procurement officer.238 
The MSBCA indicated that, pursuant to COMAR 21.05.02.12, to 
justify the correction of a bid, both the mistake and the intended 
227. Id. 21.06.02.04B; see MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-101 (1995 & Supp. 
1999) . 
228. See COMAR 21.06.02.04C. 
229. 2 MSBCA'I 152 (1987). 
230. See id. at 1. 
231. See id. at 2. 
232. See id. at 7. 
233. See id. 
234. See id. 
235. 2 MSBCA'lI 162 (1987). 
236. See id. at 1. 
237. See id. at 2. 
238. See id. 
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correction must be apparent on the face of the bid document. 239 
The mistake was not apparent on the face of the form submitted 
nor was the appropriate correction readily apparent.240 The bid 
bond, as submitted, fell short of the requirements. Therefore, the 
MSBCA concluded the procurement officer could not bind the par-
ties to promises beyond those expressed in the faulty bid bond.241 
The mistakes were not minor irregularities because the mistakes in 
the bid bond were substantive.242 
In P. Flanigan & Sons, Inc.,243 the Maryland Aviation Administra-
tion issued an IFB for certain construction work at Baltimore-
Washington International Airport.244 The IFB required a bid price 
for temporary construction items that was not to exceed 3% of the 
total bid price.245 The low bidder exceeded the 3% cap by $125,695 
on its $5,000,000 bid.246 The procurement officer determined that 
the deviation from the 3 % cap was a minor irregularity which could 
be waived. 247 
The MSBCA determined that a minor irregularity is not con-
fined to those situations where the deviation is de minimis, but 
when the deviation is trivial when compared to the total cost of the 
procurement.248 Here, the MSBCA determined that the low bidder 
did not change or unbalance its total bid by not complying with the 
3% cap. The $125,695 minimally affected-ironically, to the State's 
benefit-the value of initial progress payments without putting 
other bidders at an unfair competitive advantage.249 As a result, the 
deviation was trivial and could be waived by the procurement 
officer.25o 
239. See id. at 3. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. at 4. 
242. See id. 
243. 5 MSBCA 1: 461 (1999). 
244. See id. at 1. 
245. See id. at 2. 
246. See id. at 5-6. 
247. See id. at 4. 
248. See id. at 11. 
249. See id. at 12-13 (concluding that the procurement officer did not err in find-
ing that the deviation in the bid was trivial or that waiver would be prejudicial 
to other bidders). 
250. See id. at 11. 
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8. Contract Award 
Once the procuring agency makes a determination as to the re-
sponsible and responsive bidder who has submitted the lowest bid 
price or lowest evaluated bid price on a procurement, it is within 
the discretion of the BPW to award the contract. 251 Composed of 
the Governor, the Comptroller of the Treasury, and the Trea-
surer,252 the BPW exercises its discretion to approve the actual 
award of State of Maryland contracts.253 
If the apparent awardee recognizes any political opposition to 
the award, it is prudent, at least, to attend the BPW meeting where 
the contract award is on the BPW agenda. Even though protests of-
ficially belong in the MSBCA forum, it is not unusual for the BPW 
to be involved. For some agencies, such as the State Highway Ad-
ministration, contract awards are made without the BPW.254 For the 
others, BPW approval is required.255 The BPW can direct award of a 
contract,256 whereas the MSBCA merely determines whether the 
award was lawful. 257 
B. Competitive Sealed Proposals 
Competitive sealed proposals are used for procurement of a 
"human, social, cultural, or educational service."258 Most of the con-
tracts awarded by the federal government are awarded in accor-
dance with the competitive sealed proposal method, where the 
price is not the sole criterion for selection. In Maryland, however, 
the use of RFPs is considerably more restricted. The reason for this 
may reflect a preference, on the part of procurement officers, to 
251. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 12-107 (1995 & Supp. 1999); see also 
Kennedy Temps. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 57 Md. App. 22, 468 A.2d 1026 
(1984). 
252. See CaNsT. OF MD., DECL. RTS., art. XII, § 1. 
253. See COMAR 21.02.01.05A (1999); see also Substation Test Co., 5 MSBCA 1 429, 
at 10 (1997). 
254. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 12-101(a) (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
255. See id. § 12-101; COMAR 21.02.01.05A; see also Substation Test Co., 5 MSBCA at 
10 (noting that only the BPW, not the MSBCA, has the authority to direct an 
agency to award a contract). 
256. Disappointed bidders have occasionally derailed recommendations of contract 
award by attendance at the BPW meetings. Rarely, if ever, does the potential 
awardee need to attend the BPW meetings in order to assure contract award. 
More rare are the times that such attendance at the BPW meetings harms a 
potential awardee. 
257. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 12-203. 
258. See id. § 13-102(b)(l) (Supp. 1999). 
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minimize the opportunity for abuse and unfounded CrItIcIsm. 
Mostly, the Maryland State personnel system motivates procurement 
staffers to avoid "boss disapproval" and judgmental evaluations of 
technical quality that are fairly vulnerable to bid protests. 
The criteria in RFPs for selection of a contractor can be some-
what subjective.259 It is a difficult proposition for the evaluation 
committee or the procurement officer to select the single vendor to 
provide the services for several years when often the only parties 
competing are nearly similarly skilled to perform the work. In such 
instances, the selection criteria may indicate the technical proposal 
will count more heavily than price; however, the technical scores 
are somewhat likely to be nearly equal so that price eventually be-
comes the differentiating factor. As one federal procurement 
scholar put it: "No contracting officer ever got in trouble for award-
ing a contract to the low price offeror. "260 
Award based on creativity in the technical proposal may be vul-
nerable to undue political pressure. It is understandable, but unfor-
tunate, that the State puts excessive emphasis on low price in situa-
tions where the technical proposal should count much more. In 
some areas, changing technology makes low prices in the evaluation 
phase relatively unimportant in the performance over a long dura-
tion, and new technologies may replace earlier solutions. Procure-
ment should be based on proposals that contemplate, rather than 
eschew, such changes. Although awards based on so-called subjec-
tive criteria seem vulnerable to improper influence, Maryland has 
opted to use low bid for procurement of some services that could 
have, and perhaps should have, been procured based on competi-
tive sealed proposals to avoid any potential for improper influence. 
In Maryland, the history of abuse in the procurement arena, 
most notably the famous example of Spiro Agnew's selection of ar-
chitect/ engineer contractors based on willingness to provide kick-
backs,261 has prompted procurement officers to rely excessively on 
259. For example, subjectivity may creep into the procurement process when fac-
tors, such as, creativity and experience by the offeror in similar projects are 
considered. See COMAR 21.05.03.0IB(I) (1999) ("[S]pecifications cannot be 
prepared that would permit an award based solely on price."); MD. CODE 
ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-104(b) (2) (providing that requests for proposals 
shall include a statement of the factors that will be used in evaluating propos-
als and the relative importance of each factor). 
260. Conversation of Scott A. Livingston and Donald A. Tobin of Bastianelli, Brown 
& Kelly, on Nov. 10, 1993 (notes on file with the author). 
261. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
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price as a criterion for selection. For example, in the on-line com-
puter games contract awarded December 6, 1995, the lottery direc-
tor indicated the selection was based on low price because lottery 
services were regarded as a commodity that was not "rocket sci-
ence;"262 however, the other thirty-one states in the country used 
competitive sealed proposals for the selection of such contractors.263 
In other states, technical proposals for certain technology-based in-
dustries are weighted much more heavily than price because inn ova-
tiveness is important. In Maryland, vulnerability to improper politi-
cal influence hinders procurement properly disconnected from 
pure cost considerations. 
1. Solicitations 
Each RFP issued by the State must include general information 
relating to the submission of proposals.264 The award of contracts 
pursuant to an RFP is based on more than price, so RFPs must in-
clude all the evaluation factors to be considered and the relative im-
portance of each evaluation factor.265 The State gives public notice 
of RFPs in the same manner as notice for IFBs.266 Pre-proposal 
meetings may take place in the same manner as pre-bid meetings267 
and amendments to RFPs are made in the same manner as amend-
ments to IFBs.268 
With the advent of more technology contracts awarded by the 
State, the determination of responsibility in response to an IFB may 
be blurred with the determination of qualifications for the award of 
a contract in response to an RFP. In an RFP where the government 
requires certain technical disciplines, a team of proposers may be 
offered to satisfy all of the different requirements. To be minimally 
compliant, the offeror must have the several disciplines noted in 
the technical section of a RFP. Each of those members must likewise 
be a responsible party-one that has not been found lacking, for 
example, in integrity. This becomes important where offerors, and 
bidders, as a team, select partners or colleagues to participate in the 
262. Lloyd Jones, statement at a Board of Public Works Meeting (Dec. 6, 1997). 
263. See id. 
264. See COMAR 21.05.03.02A(1) (listing that information that should be included 
in a request includes the ~date, time, and place for the receipt of the propos-
als") . 
265. See id. 21.05.03.02A(2). 
266. See id. 21.05.03.02B; see also supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
267. See COMAR 21.05.03.02D. 
268. See id. 21.05.03.02E. 
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potential opportunity. The team manager should make sure that all 
members of the team satisfy the minimum legal and ethical require-
ments for award of a contract because sooner or later the procure-
ment officer will make sure they do, sometimes at the behest of a 
potential bid protestor. 
2. Evaluation Criteria 
The State must tell potential offerors, in detail, what goods and 
services it needs and how it, as the customer, will decide what to 
buy. Generally, an RFP must inform offerors of the evaluation crite-
ria, including the scoring scheme that the agency intends to use to 
evaluate the proposals.269 It must give reasonably definitive informa-
tion as to the relative importance of the factors to be used in the 
evaluation.27o This disclosure to offerors is necessary to ensure fair 
and equal competition among the offerors.271 Any sub-factors that 
are used, however, "need not be disclosed so long as they merely 
are definitive of the principal evaluation factors listed in the RFP."272 
Undisclosed sub-factors, perhaps inchoate in the evaluator's mind, 
hardly solidify the confidence and expectation of fair play of the of-
feror. In any event, award of a contract is then made to the respon-
sible offeror whose proposal offers the greatest advantage to the 
State.273 
In Fujitsu Business Communications SYStems,274 the RFP called for 
furnishing, installing, and maintaining a routing system for tele-
phone calls.275 The RFP contained evaluation criteria and provided 
that the technical score would be sixty percent of the overall score, 
and price would be forty percent of the overall score. 276 The 
MSBCA decided that, in evaluating the proposal, the procuring 
agency wrongfully evaluated the proposals based on a criterion un-
stated in the RFP.277 Agencies must adhere to the evaluation criteria 
269. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-104(b) (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
270. See, e.g., A&R/Bowie Ltd. Partnership, 4 MSBCA , 316, at 11 (1992) (citing 
United Tech. Corp. & Bell Helicopter, Textron, 3 MSBCA , 201, at 35 
(1989». 
271. See Fujitsu Business Communication Sys., 4 MSBCA, 334, at 31 (1993) (citing 
Mid-Atlantic Vision Servo Plan, Inc., 2 MSBCA, 173 (1988». 
272. [d. 
273. See id. 
274. 4 MSBCA 1 334 (1993). 
275. See id. at 2. 
276. See id. at 31. 
277. See id. at 3~32. 
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listed in the RFP.278 The MSBCA further concluded that technical 
scores were given in categories that were not susceptible of being 
scored, such as giving points for providing basic information such as 
the bidder's name, address, and Federal Communications Commis-
sion identification number.279 The MSBCA found that such scoring 
bore no rational relationship to the truly technical items in the pro-
posal and that the scoring of those items was arbitrary and capri-
cious.28o The MSBCA remanded to the agency to rescore in accor-
dance with the evaluation factors contained within the RFP.281 
3. Discussions 
The procuring agency may hold discussions with qualified offer-
ors to assure full understanding of the agency's requirements, ascer-
tain the offerors' abilities to perform, obtain the best price for the 
state, and arrive at a contract price that is the most advantageous to 
the State.282 If the procuring agency conducts discussions "with one 
offeror, it must do so with all offerors who have submitted [accept-
able] proposals" or proposals that are "susceptible of being made 
acceptable."283 For an offeror who submits a proposal that is suscep-
tible of being made acceptable, the offeror must be given a mean-
ingful opportunity in discussions to amend its proposal so as to 
make it acceptable.284 
If the State can reasonably avoid decreasing the field of compe-
tition, it should do so. The officials who conduct such discussions 
are prohibited from "coaching" other offerors by disclosing any in-
formation derived from another offeror's proposal, except for 
"price and information related directly to price."285 Otherwise, an 
offeror would be disinclined to propose any creative or original so-
lutions to state problems. 
4. Bias 
The procuring agency must evaluate proposals in an unbiased 
manner so as to give each offeror a fair and equal opportunity to 
278. See id.; see Nutrition Management Servs. Co., 4 MSBCA 1 363, at 9 (1994). 
279. See Fujitsu Business Communication Sys., 4 MSBCA at 32. 
280. See id. 
281. See id. at 34. 
282. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 13-104(d) (1995 & Supp. 1999); 
COMAR 21.05.03.03C(2)(a)-(c) (1999). 
283. Fujitsu Business Communications Sys., 4 MSBCA at 33. 
284. See id. 
285. COMAR 21.05.03.03C(3) (a), (b) (ii). 
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compete for a contract.286 In making a claim of bias, the offeror 
bears the heavy burden of proof to show that procurement agency 
evaluators were biased.287 Indeed, the offeror must" 'offer virtually 
irrefutable proof, not mere inference or supposition, that the 
agency acted with a specific and malicious inten[t] to injure the [of-
feror].' "288 The authors have encountered numerous allegations, 
but little evidence, of such malicious intent. 
For various goods and services, the State has recurring needs; 
in such situations, an incumbent vendor often seeks the follow-on 
contract for the next several years. It is difficult for all of the offer-
ors to be on a perfectly equal footing in these circumstances. 
Incumbency has its advantages and disadvantages. An incum-
bent promising to perform for the follow-on period of time is 
viewed, not surprisingly, through the lens of experience that the us-
ing agency has had with the incumbent. Procurement officers evalu-
ating the proposal are entitled to consider past performance, espe-
cially the immediate performance, of the offeror when it promises 
to perform everything satisfactorily, despite previous unfulfilled 
promises. The circumstances also allow the incumbent to have ac-
cess, on a daily basis, to people who are likely to be on the evalua-
tion team. This gives an opportunity for bias in favor of the contrac-
tor if things are going well. 
For the outsider, it is often difficult to know the extent, if any, 
of the real advantages or disadvantages. Procurement officers tend 
to go out of their way to assure outside competitors will have a fair 
chance at awards. If the field of competition is tilted in favor of the 
incumbent, few others will compete, and taxpayers will be harmed 
in the long run. It may be noted that in 1997, a bill in the Mary-
land General Assembly was proposed to require consideration of 
"past performance"289 and it was defeated.290 The inference should 
not be drawn that past performance is irrelevant merely because 
this bill did not become law. 
In Calso Communications, Inc.,29J DGS issued an RFP "for the 
purchase, installation and maintenance of telephone and electronic 
286. See Homecoming, Inc., 4 MSBCA , 309 (1992). 
287. See id. at 11; Benton & Assoc., Docket Nos. MSBCA 2196 & 2201 (Nov. 1, 
2000). 
288. Id. (citations omitted). 
289. This bill was House Bill 1282 of the 1997 General Assembly Session. 
290. See id. 
291. 2 MSBCA 'I 1377 (1988). 
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key telephone systems for its facilities statewide. "292 The incumbent 
vendor competed for the follow~n contract.293 The four members 
of the evaluation panel had all, at some point, expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the incumbent, and DGS selected a new vendor.294 In the 
protest appeal, the MSBCA determined that the incumbent vendor 
must prove "that the agency acted with a specific and malicious in-
tent to injure the [incumbentJ."295 The MSBCA established a daunt-
ing standard because, even if there were actual bias, the agency's 
decision "will be upheld unless such bias is clearly shown to have 
permeated the decision. "296 Here, the evaluators had simply ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the past performance.297 The incumbent 
failed to prove that the only reason for the selection of the evalu-
ators, however, by the agency was its dissatisfaction with the incum-
bent.298 As a result, the selection of the evaluators had a rational ba-
sis and could not be said to have been based on improper 
motives.299 
5. Evaluation on a Point System is Not Required 
Pursuant to COMAR 21.05.03.03A(4), evaluating proposals us-
ing a numerical rating system is not required. Even when numerical 
rating systems are used in the evaluation of proposals, the numeri-
cal ratings are used as mere guidelines in the selection of an offeror 
whose proposal is the most advantageous to the State.3OO 
The MSBCA has recognized that the proposal evaluation pro-
cess is inherently subjective and even the use of numerical rating 
systems cannot make the process absolutely objective.3Dl In evaluat-
ing proposals, more than price is considered, and the evaluators 
must determine which proposal, overall, will be the most advanta-
geous to the State. Point systems seem unnecessary where the pur- . 
pose of the procurement is to award the contract based on factors 
that are immeasurable by mathematical calculations. 
292. Id. at 2. 
293. See id. at 5-8. 
294. See id. 
295. Id. at 10. 
296. Id. 
297. See id. 
298. See id. at 10-11. 
299. See id. at 11. 
300. See Triad Management Sys., Inc. & Comprehensive Tech., Inc., 4 MSSCA ,. 
378, at 12 (1995). 
301. See id. 
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6. Economic Benefits to Maryland 
The procurement process may be used to achieve economic de-
velopment, akin to the use of procurement to achieve socio-
economic goals. 302 In 1996, the procurement regulations were 
amended so that procuring agencies would include, "'an economic-
benefits' factor as one of several technical factors to be evaluated in 
determining which offeror's proposal is the most advantageous to 
the State. "303 The purpose of the economic benefits factor is to en-
courage offerors "to be innovative in developing their proposals 
and to demonstrate how awarding the contract to them will provide 
economic benefits to the State of Maryland. "304 
To illustrate, in one RFP, the State required offerors to submit· 
a narrative describing the benefits that would accrue to the Mary-
land economy as a direct or indirect result of the offeror's perform-
ance on the contract.305 The items considered were: "[i]temized and 
total contract expenditures . . . used for Maryland subcontractors, 
suppliers, and joint venture partners, "306 the "number and types of 
jobs for Maryland residents,"307 "[ihemized and total tax revenues 
. . . to be generated for Maryland and its political subdivisions,"308 
"[i] temized and total contract expenditures . . . committed to Ma-
ryland small businesses and MBEs, "309 and any "[0] ther benefits to 
the Maryland economy which the offeror promises will result from 
302. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14-301 (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
303. BPW Advisory Opinion No. P-004-96, Using Economic-Benefits as a Factfff in Eval-
uating Competitive Sealed Proposals, at 1 (1996); COMAR 21.05.03.03A(3) (1999). 
The Procurement Advisory Council and its principal staff, the Governor's Pro-
curement Advisory Council, provide another source for procurement policy 
and good management. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 12-102, -105. 
304. BPW Advisory opinion No. P-004-96, at 1. 
305. See DEPT. OF TRANS., MVA ADMIN., VEHICLE EMISSIONS INSPECTION PROGRAM, So. 
UCITATION REFERENCE No. V-HQ99-111-S § IV.E, at 51 (Apr. 13, 1999) (herein-
after "YElP"). 
306. See id.; see also COMAR 21.05.03.03A(3) (i) (listing an economic benefits factor 
as "[t]he offeror's intended procurement from Maryland subcontractors, sup-
pliers, and joint venture partners"). 
307. See VEIP, Section IV.E at p. 51; see also COMAR 21.05.0303A(3) (ii) (listing an 
economic benefits factor as "[ t] he number of jobs generated for Maryland re-
sidents"). 
308. See VEIP, Section IV.E at p. 51; see also COMAR 21.05.0303A(3) (iii) (listing an 
economic benefits factor as " [tlax revenues generated to Maryland and its po-
litical sUbdivisions"). 
309. See VEIP, Section IV.E at p. 51; see also COMAR 21.05.0303A(3) (iv) (listing an 
economic benefits factor as "[t]he amount or percentage of subcontract dol-
lars placed with Maryland smail businesses and Maryland MBEs"). 
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awarding the contract to the offeror. "310 Such an economic benefits 
factor can be critized because it leaves unclear whether an offeror 
will lose points, for example, if it pays fewer taxes due to a lower 
price, as compared with a less efficient offeror whose higher labor 
costs presumably generate greater payroll taxes for the benefit of 
the State of Maryland. 
The economic benefits factor has various conditions on its use. 
It is only to be used for proposals for contracts that may be reasona-
bly expected to exceed $25,000.311 The economic benefits factor sup-
posedly should not be interpreted as a preference for resident offer-
ors. The purpose of the economic benefits factor is not to award 
contracts to Maryland offerors, but to any offerors who will provide 
certain economic benefits to Maryland through the performance of 
the contract. Indeed, Maryland procurement law does not provide 
for preferences, only reciprocal preferences.312 
The substantial economic benefits factor has been subject to 
some criticism. Regardless of the awardee, most of the work, such as 
construction projects, inspection services, and vehicle emission in-
spection services, is often done by people living in Maryland. It is 
quite unlikely that any party could have a significantly greater eco-
nomic benefit for the State than any other party. It may become rel-
evant, however, where a bulk of the work can be done outside the 
state. For example, in the Y2K compliance project, some vendors 
hired software engineers from India to perform the programming 
work furnished to the State as part of the compliance work. Taxpay-
ers would benefit because, presumably, the relatively lower costs due 
to performance out of the country were reflected in the lower bid 
price. Likewise, Maryland contractors competing for contracts in 
other states would not appreciate such a factor used against them 
when competing for non-Maryland contracts. 
310. See VEIP, Section W.E at p. 51; see also COMAR 21.05.0303A(c) (providing that 
offerors may receive "up to half the total allocable technical points under an 
economic-benefits evaluation factor for other elements directly or indirectly 
attributable to the contract that contribute to the Maryland economy"). 
311. See BPW Advisory Opinion No. P-004-96, Using Economic Benefits as a Fador in 
Evaluating Competitive Sealed Proposals, at 1 (1996). 
312. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14401 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR 
21.05.01.04. 
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IV. BID PROTESTS 
A. Pre-Opening Bid Protests 
The bid protest is a creature of government procurement. In 
the private commercial sector, it is exceedingly unlikely that a ven-
dor would challenge the sovereignty of the customer in deciding 
which vendor to whom to award a contract. There are more success-
ful ways of marketing than suing potential customers; often vendors 
have little choice but to assert their lawful rights to fair treatment. 
In the public sector, laws obligate the procurement officer to treat 
the vendors in a fair manner, and vendors should feel comfortable 
protecting their rights. Retaliation from procurement officers seems 
a remote possibility. Procurement officers tend to be professionals 
who are less concerned with selecting a particular awardee and 
more concerned with fashioning a system of procurement integrity. 
The government induces vendors to compete for contracts in con-
sideration for the government's promise, implied or otherwise, to 
fairly evaluate the proposals.313 A challenge to formation of a con-
tract or the sufficiency of the solicitation seldom, in the authors' 
view, offends the professional procurement officer. 
The bid protest, as a legal action, lies at the heart of the pro-
curement process. It is in this forum where the community of inter-
ested parties can best express its reasons why, as a matter of fair 
play, a solicitation is unduly restrictive or a contract should be 
formed with a particular party. Although the procedures were de-
signed to be simple, bid protests have developed into sophisticated 
litigation, akin to the most demanding trials in circuit courts. 
The bid protest procedure generally proceeds through the fol-
lowing steps. Prior to and after the submission of the offer, an ag-
grieved party may file a bid protest with the procuring agency chal-
lenging some aspect of the procurement.314 A bid protest is a 
313. For this reason, if the procurement officer fails to consider the proposal fairly, 
the usual remedy for the bidder is compensation for its bid preparation costs. 
The disappointed bidder seldom recovers contract damages measured by the 
amount of profit it would have earned but for the contracting procurement 
officer's misconduct for one reason: there never was a contract awarded to 
the bidder. Breach damages measured by lost profits, therefore, seldom seem 
appropriate, except in civil rights cases such as those based on 42 U.S.C. 
§1983. 
314. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. § 15-215 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR 
21.10.02.0IB(3), .02A, .03. 
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written complaint filed by an interested party315 addressed to the 
procurement officer.316 Bid protests based on alleged improprieties 
in the solicitation that are apparent prior to bid opening must be 
filed prior to bid opening.317 For protests challenging the appropri-
ateness of contract formation, the deadline is seven days from when 
the protester knew or should have known of the basis for the pro-
test.318 
The MSBCA strictly construes this timeliness requirement as be-
ing substar!tive in nature and not susceptible to waiver.319 Any un-
timely protest "necessarily prejudices the rights and interest of the 
low bidder, the contracting agency and perhaps other interested 
parties. "320 Failure to raise a timely protest results "in the individ-
ual interest of the offeror being outweighed by the public interest 
involved in assuring that [s]tate procurement proceed without de- . 
lay. "321 Practitioners looking to secure the rights of a bidder are ad-
vised that the Office of the Attorney General, who defends the state 
in such bid protests, aggressively defends against bid protests on 
grounds of untimeliness. 
315. See id. 21.10.02.01B(1) (defining "interested party" as "an actual or prospective 
bidder, offeror, or contractor that may be aggrieved by the solicitation or 
award of a contract, or by the protest"). 
316. See id. 21.10.02.02A. 
317. See id. 21.10.02.03A; see also, e.g., State Highway Admin. v. Bramble, 351 Md. 
226, 228 n.l, 717 A.2d 943, 94344 n.l (1998) (noting that the MSBCA has 
held that a contractor is required to inquire about any perceived discrepan-
cies prior to bid); Century Elevator, Inc., 5 MSBCA, 466, at 6 (1999) (con-
cluding that it is "too late" to protest bid criteria after bid opening); Ameri-
can Sanitary Prods., Inc., 5 MSBCA, 455, at 4 (1999) (restating that a protest 
is required to be filed prior to bid opening); J&J Reprod. & Drafting Sup-
plies, Inc., 5 MSBCA 'I 409, at 3 (1996) (concluding a bid protest was un-
timely under COMAR 21.10.02.03); Bruce D. Royster, 5 MSBCA , 406, at 6 
n.l (1996) (concluding that the MSBCA had no jurisdiction because the ap-
pellant did not file a timely bid protest). 
318. See COMAR 21.1O.02.03B. 
319. See FMB Laundry Corp., 5 MSBCA, 467, at 5 (1999). Indeed, failure by bid-
ders to protest timely divests the MSBCA of subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
an appeal from the final decision of the procurement officer. See JCV, Inc., 5 
MSBCA, 445, at 3 (1998). Likewise, failure to file a timely claim divests the 
MSBCA of subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the final deci-
sion of the procurement officer. See Cherry Hill Constr., Inc., 5 MSBCA , 459, 
at 16 (1999). 
320. FMB Laundry Carp., 5 MSBCA, at 5. 
321. Wilbanks Tech. Corp., 5 MSBCA , 440, at 3 (1998) (citing Rolm Mid-Atl., 1 
MSBCA 'I 35, at 6 (1983»; see also ]&] &prod. & Drafting Supplies, Inc., 5 
MSBCA at 3. 
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In Merjo Advertising & Sales Promotions CO.,322 the DGS issued an 
IFB for the purchase of three types of signs for use by the lottery. 
The IFB provided that the vendor should be "capable and 
equipped to produce this project entirely within [its] own facili-
ties. "323 Mter bid opening, a disappointed bidder filed a protest 
and claimed that the requirement that signs be manufactured "en-
tirely" within the vendor's facilities could not be complied with if 
the IFB were read literally.324 The MSBCA decided that, because 
the IFB clearly stated the requirement that the bidder had to make 
the signs entirely within its own facilities, " [a]ny objection [the dis-
appointed bidder] had concerning the reasonableness of this re-
quirement or its meaning was required to be filed before bid open-
ing."325 The disappointed bidder did not file a protest prior to bid 
opening, so the MSBCA dismissed the protest as untimely.326 
As is evident from numerous bid protest appeals, the MSBCA 
aims to minimize any disruption to the procurement process. 
Where a procurement officer's decision is not unreasonable, it will 
be upheld as consistent with the standards of review established by 
the APA. 327 Where a bidder arguably misses the deadline for filing 
an appeal to the MSBCA, the MSBCA looks hard to avoid any con-
troversial expansion of its jurisdiction. 
This strictness, which seems illiberal to the disappointed ven-
dor, may be a necessary evil in the system. The jurisdiction of the 
MSBCA is clearly established by the Maryland General Assembly, 
and any tardiness in filing a bid protest is readily deemed fatal. The 
MSBCA uses this notion to carefully distinguish between those im-
proprieties in the formation of a contract versus those improprieties 
in the application of proper specifications. 328 If the gist of the bid-
der's complaint is that an improper specification was eventually ap-
plied unfavorably to the bidder, the MSBCA swiftly concludes that 
the bidder failed to file his claim in a timely manner-prior to bid 
opening. 
Pre-opening bid protests concern specifications that improperly 
favor a single prospective bidder or are otherwise unduly restric-
322. 5 MSBCA 1 396 (1996). 
323. [d. at 2. 
324. See id. at 3. 
325. [d. at 4. 
326. See id. 
327. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE GoV'T § 10-201 (1999 & Supp. 1999). 
328. See generally Trane Co., 5 MSBCA 1 118, at 5 (1985) (denying a protest to 
modification specifications because of untimeliness). 
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tive.329 In Siems Rental & Sales CO.,330 the DGS issued a specification 
which required self-propelled lift platforms to be a width of thirty-
two inches with a one-inch margin of error.331 The bidder argued 
that the specification was unduly restrictive because only one plat-
form made by one company met those specifications. If the DGS re-
vised the specification to thirty-three inches with a one inch margin 
of error, several platforms would be available to the DGS.332 A DGS 
representative stated that the thirty-two inch specification was cho-
sen simply as a result of looking at a sales flyer from a particular 
vendor.333 
The MSBCA concluded that a "procurement officer has broad 
discretion in drafting specifications to meet the State's minimum re-
quirements when weighed against the [s] tate policy of fostering the 
maximum practical competition. "334 The MSBCA would not substi-
tute its technical judgment for the procurement officer's judgment, 
but would determine whether the specifications did "unreasonably 
restrict competition contrary to Maryland procurement law. "335 
The MSBCA determined that the DGS presented no facts that justi-
fied the strict measurements listed in the specification.336 As a re-
sult, the MSBCA sustained the protest on the grounds that the spec-
ifications were unduly restrictive.337 This opinion, consistent with 
procurement policy, broadened the field of competition for the 
benefit of the taxpayers.338 
329. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §13-205 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR 
21.04.01.02A (1999) (providing that specifications are written to permit "maxi-
mum practicable competition"); see also Xerox Corp., 1 MSBCA 1 48, at 6 
(1983) (limiting the MSBCA's determinations regarding the drafting of speci-
fications to a determination of whether the specifications "unreasonably re-
strict competition and cannot substitute its judgment as to technical require-
ments for that of the procuring agency"). 
330. 3 MSBCA 1 288 (1991). 
331. See id. at 1-2. 
332. See id. at 2. 
333. See id. 
334. [d. at 3. 
335. [d. at 4 (citations omitted). 
336. See id. at 4-5 (indicating that such facts could have included measurements of 
doorways, space between parked buses, and areas in and around where the 
lift was to be used). 
337. See id. at 5. 
338. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-201(a)(4) (1995 & Supp. 1999) 
(indicating a purpose of the procurement law is to foster "effective broad-
based competition in the State through support of the free enterprise sys-
tem"). 
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B. Post-opening Bid Protests 
As with pre-opening bid protests, the MSBCA lacks jurisdiction 
to hear an untimely appeal from a procurement officer's final deci-
sion on a protest concerning formation of a contract.339 All protests 
must be filed within seven days of when the protestor knew or 
should have known of the basis for the protest.340 Assuming that a 
protest is timely filed, the protester seldom will succeed in its pro-
test unless a technical legal violation puts the apparent low bidder 
at an unfair competitive advantage. The protestor most likely suc-
ceeds in its protest where the technical legal violation puts an op-
posing biddel' at a tangible competitive advantage. 
In Daly Computers Inc.,341 the Department of Budget and Fiscal 
Planning issued an IFB for computers, including a requirement that 
all computers have Novell certification, a costly requirement.342 The 
State awarded the contract to the apparent low bidder even though 
the low bidder's computers were not Novell-certified.343 Noting that 
bidders must be accorded fair and equitable treatment, the MSBCA 
sustained this protest. The low bidder received an unfair competi-
tive advantage by not spending the money necessary to have its 
computers certified by Novell, as the protestor did.344 
In Midasco, Inc.,345 SHA solicited bids to furnish and install cer-
tain advanced traffic management equipment. Prior to bid opening, 
the bidder notified an SHA project manager of a discrepancy in the 
bid documents. The index of quantities listed an estimate of 430 
linear feet of conduit, whereas the schedule of prices indicated 
8,215 feet of conduit. The SHA project manager indicated it was 
too late to postpone bid opening.346 Bids were opened publicly. M-
ter bid opening, the procurement officer decided to reject all bids 
and resolicit the project at a later date.347 
On this project, Midasco bid $.01 per linear foot for the con-
duit. The second low bidder bid $15.80 per linear foot. As a basis 
for rejection of the bids, the procurement officer's subordinates ex-
pressed a concern that Midasco's bid was materially unbalanced. At 
339. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. §15-217. 
340. See COMAR 21.10.02.03B (1999). 
341. 4 MSBCA t 329 (1993). 
342. See id. at 2. 
343. See id. at 9. 
344. See id. at 11-12. 
345. Docket No. MSBCA 2209 (Jan. 31, 2001). 
346. See Helmut Guenshcel, Inc., 3 MSBCA t 211, at 7 (1989). 
347. See Midasco, Docket No. MSBCA 2209, at 5. 
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the MSBCA hearing, the procurement officer testified that he did 
not believe that Midasco's bid was materially unbalanced. Instead, 
he testified that he was concerned that the discrepancy in quantity 
could necessitate the use of the variations in estimated quantities 
("VEQ") clause, which meant that Midasco's bid mayor may not re-
sult in the lowest ultimate cost to the State. 
The low bidder's protest was denied, but on appeal the MSBCA 
found in favor of the low bidder.348 While acknowledging that the 
decision to reject all bids is a discretionary determination by the 
procurement officer, the MSBCA determined that the decision was 
so "arbitrary and capricious as to constitute a breach of trust. "349 
The MSBCA determined that SHA made four mistakes that 
breached the trust. First, SHA showed the bid item incorrectly on 
the schedule of prices. Second, the low bidder advised SHA of the 
discrepancy and SHA failed to take timely action. Third, SHA ac-
cepted and publicly opened all bids knowing there was a question 
with the bid. Finally, SHA failed to recognize the error had no 
negative consequences to the bidders. Here, SHA failed to demon-
strate that any bidder had an unfair advantage because all bidders 
were on the same footing with respect to the mistake. The MSBCA 
determined that a resolicitation after prices were revealed was not 
in the State's best interest and was unfair to the low bidder. 
V. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. MSBCA Jurisdiction 
A protest must be filed with the procurement officer,35o and the 
procurement officer must expeditiously issue a final decision either 
sustaining or denying the protest.351 It is only after the procurement 
348. Unusually, this opinion resulted in a dissenting opinion, which is quite un-
common at the MSBCA. The MSBCA, by statute, consists of three members. 
As of the date of the Midasco decision, only two members were sitting at the 
MSBCA, with the third position having been vacant since approximately Au-
gust 2000. Midasco was the first split decision of the two-member MSBCA. The 
MSBCA members decided that the only fair way to resolve the split in the de-
cision was to have the appellant prevail where one of the two MSBCA mem-
bers found that the appellant's appeal should be sustained. See id. at 9, 10. 
Even if this decision is overturned on appeal, the MSBCA's decision is instruc-
tive of how the 
349. Id. at 8. 
350. See COMAR 21.10.02.02 (1999) (providing that the protest must be in writing 
and submitted to the procurement officer). 
351. See id. 21.1O.02.09A ("A decision on a protest shall be made by the procure-
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officer's final decision that the matter may be appealed to the 
MSBCA.352 The MSBCA is a statutorily-created body vested with fi-
nite jurisdiction to hear and decide appeals arising from final 
agency action that pertains to bid protests and contract claims.353 
This means the procurement officer's action must be final. If there 
is no final decision of the procurement officer, the MSBCA lacks 
the jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 354 
B. Effect of Filing Bid Protests 
When a party files a timely bid protest prior to bid opening, 
the time for submitting bids is supposed to be postponed.355 A 
party is entitled to an answer prior to bid opening, even if it means 
postponing the date or time for receipt of bids.356 A bidder need 
not submit a timely bid to protect its interests once a timely bid 
protest has been filed. 357 
Ordinarily, contract award is postponed when a bid protest is 
filed after bid opening and "the authority to award a contract has 
not been delegated to a department pursuant to COMAR 
21.02.01.04."358 There is one exception: the BPW may find that "ex-
ecution of the contract without delay is necessary to protect substan-
tial [s] tate interests. "359 If so, a contract award is proper in the face 
of the protest.360 "If the authority to award a contract has been del-
egated to a department pursuant to COMAR 21.02.01.04,"361 con-
tract award is postponed until either the agency head determines 
that "execution of the contract without delay is necessary to protect 
ment officer in writing 'as expeditiously as possible after receiving all relevant, 
requested information."). 
352. See id. 21.10.02.09C(3) (providing the criteria for an appeal to the MSBCA). 
353. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC.§ 15-211(a) (1995 & Supp. 1999). 
354. See Hess Fence & Supply Co., 5 MSBCA'I 438, at 2 (1998) (concluding that 
there was no jurisdiction because the appellant did not appeal from a final 
agency determination). Once the MSBCA issues a final decision, the appellant 
or the government may seek judicial review of the MSBCA's decision at the 
circuit court level. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 15-223; Md. Rules 
7-201 to -210. 
355. See Helmut Guenschel, Inc., 3 MSBCA'I 211, at 7 (1989). 
356. See id. at 7. 
357. See id. 
358. COMAR 21.10.02.11A (1999). 
359. [d. 21.10.02.11A. 
360. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §10-204 (1995 & Supp. 1999); COMAR 
21.10.02. 11 A. 
361. COMAR 21.10.02.11B. 
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the substantial [s] tate interests"362 or the MSBCA issues a final deci-
sion.363 If the contract is to be executed prior to a final decision by 
the MSBCA, the procuring agency must notify the MSBCA.364 
Of the thousands of contract awards approved by the BPW an-
nually, there are approximately thirty to fifty bid protests per year 
appealed to the MSBCA. Of these, there are fewer than five annu-
ally where the BPW awards a contract in the face of the bid protest. 
In a few instances per year, however, the BPW finds that substantial 
state interests justify immediate award of the contract in the face of 
a pending bid protest. In one case in 1994,365 the BPW entertained 
approximately 500 pages of documents indicating why it was vital 
that the award be made in spite of the pendency of the bid protest. 
There is a good reason for the BPW to refrain from awarding 
in the face of a bid protest. The MSBCA may sustain the appeal. If 
so, the BPW's approval of the contract would have to be rescinded. 
A bidder deserves a meaningful opportunity to be heard in a neu-
tral forum prior to award. Otherwise, the prize for which the bidder 
competed-the contract-is lost. An undeserving party may get the 
benefit of procurement mischief. 
When the MSBCA issues a decision on the bid protest, it cre-
ates a body of law for the subsequent disposition of future bid pro-
tests. Vendors and legal practitioners alike use this body of law to 
understand and predict how the MSBCA would view certain argu-
ments. This helps avoid future bid protests. The procurement com-
munity is better able to assess, in advance, the likelihood of success 
thanks to the MSBCA's jurisprudence. 
By contrast, in less sophisticated systems, such as the Board of 
Estimates in Baltimore City, no body of law is developed. The result 
is a lack of confidence in the integrity of the contract awards, which 
seem to be amenable to the mercurial attitudes of officials who are 
not guided by stare decisis. 
Indeed, one of the main reasons for creating the MSBCA was 
to develop such a body of law.366 In contrast to arbitration, where 
the reasons for the decisions are seldom spelled out and would not 
be binding on subsequent parties, the MSBCA has, through diligent 
and scholarly efforts, established a hefty body of law to guide the 
362. [d. 21.10.02.11B(1). 
363. See COMAR 21.10.02.1lB(2). 
364. See id . . 1O.02.11A(2), .llB(2). 
365. See Distance Learning Fiber Optic Contract, Issued by the Department of 
Budget and Fiscal Planning (1994). 
366. See Livingston, supra note 7, at 231. 
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disposition of future disputes in bid protests. It is an element of the 
modern procurement system that there is this "transparency" where 
vendors can see what the rules are; or at least what rules have been 
applied in the past. 
VI. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL POINTS 
The public interest lays in proper application of the procure-
ment laws, which depends on the parties' diligent effort to honor 
procurement procedures for award and enforcement of contract 
promises. In the words of the court of appeals in State v. Dashiell:366 
"[A] contractual obligation is binding on the conscience of the sov-
ereign. "367 Beyond the moral rationale for such a remark, there are 
strong practical reasons why parties, especially the State, should be 
held strictly to obey its own rules and abide by its procurement con-
tract promises. If the State is too readily excused from the procedu-
ral laws or a substantive promise, or is able to allocate too much 
risk to a contract awardee, a contractor's eagerness to compete is di-
minished, higher prices for goods and services are the result. 
In Stanbalt Associates v. State,368 the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland addressed a new risk for contractors. In this case, the Gov-
ernor of Maryland signed a lease with Stanbalt Associates 
("Stanbalt").369 Over the first eleven years of the lease term, the 
Governor requested sufficient funds in his annual Budget Bill for 
appropriation from the Maryland General Assembly to pay the 
agreed-upon rent.370 One year later, the Maryland General Assembly 
reduced the amount of rent requested during the first year. The 
Governor declined to request the agreed-upon rent amount in sub-
sequent years.37I Stanbalt argued that the Governor erred in failing 
to request a rent increase from the General Assembly.372 The court 
of special appeals, in affirming the trial court's decision to dismiss 
the case, characterized the proposed request for an increase in rent 
by the Governor to be an "exercise in futility."373 
In reaching its decision, the court rejected Stanbalt's argument 
that implicit in the contract was an obligation on the Governor's 
366. 195 Md. 677, 75 A.2d 348 (1950). 
367. Id. at 692, 75 A.2d at 355. 
368. No. 1628, slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 8, 2000). 
369. See id. at 1. 
370. See id. 
371. See id. at 7. 
372. See id. 
373. See id. at 8. 
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part to seek sufficient funds from the Maryland General Assembly.374 
The decision of the court of special appeals presents a new risk for 
contractors, namely that the executive department might not even 
seek sufficient funds to pay a multi-year contract.375 Historically, 
contractors realized the risk of non-cooperation by the Maryland 
General Assembly when it came to appropriations to pay for multi-
year contracts. Suddenly, there is no longer an implied duty of 
good faith on the part of the Governor to request sufficient funds 
for contracts. This will likely discourage vigorous competition for 
such contracts. 
The State spends billions of dollars annually procuring goods 
and services from contractors. The State induces these contractors 
to compete for state contracts, and taxpayers benefit from such 
competition because it maximizes the purchasing power of the 
State.376 Contractors who perceive that the State will disregard the 
rules or decline to pay for services may not compete vigorously; the 
result would be serious harm to the state procurement system. 
Some bidders may inflate their bid prices in case the State 
forces the bidder to file expensive protests to assure award. Other 
bidders would rather run the risk of non-selection because they 
might not be the low bidder, than run the risk that state officials 
will dishonor the award procedures or contract terms after the con-
tract. If, for instance, the bid prices drift upwards by 3% because 
bidders slightly inflate their prices, the State would spend 
$240,000,000 more annually for the purchase of such goods and ser-
vices. If the State fairly treats contractors who inflated their bids, 
the taxpayers will have spent more than necessary, and the contrac-
tor will experience a windfall. 
Some contractors will not inflate their bids. They may assume it 
is better to submit an offer and simply hope to minimize the risk 
that the State will misapply the regulations governing award or will 
not honor the terms of the contract. Distrust of the State may en-
courage contractors to take actions they would otherwise not take. 
To make sure the State honors its bargain, some contractors might 
seek to apply political influence to state officials for protection 
against such contract problems.377 These practices will undermine 
374. See id. 
375. See id. 
376. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 11-201(a)(7) (1995 & Supp. 1999) 
(listing the purposes and policies of general procurement law). 
377. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
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the integrity of the procurement system and discourage competition 
for state contracts. Again, this would generate an adverse effect on 
taxpayers. 378 
Some potential contractors will decide not to compete for Ma-
ryland contracts. These contractors may conclude it is better to al-
locate finite bidding resources towards opportunities with other gov-
ernment customers who treat contractors more fairly. For example, 
the State is allowed to include an indemnification clause that re-
quires contractors to assume unlimited liability on contracts.379 Al-
though such a provision may deter potential bidders, this is bal-
anced against the need for the State to protect against the risk of 
future liability for a contractor's negligence.38o However, these pro-
visions are perceived as excessively favorable to the State and do de-
ter bidders. IBM declined to bid on the lucrative Network Services 
Contract with the Department of Budget and Management because 
of an indemnification clause that allocated excessive risk.381 When a 
contractor decides not to expend bidding resources to compete for 
Maryland contracts, because of the State's reputation for being un-
fair, there is a harmful reduction in the field of competition that 
harms taxpayers. 
Procurement of goods and services is, and always has been, 
necessary to accomplish state objectives. As long as procurement 
practices are fair, contractors will compete vigorously. Among the 
essential features of any fair system are rules that are chosen meta-
phorically by those who are "behind a veil of ignorance" about 
their positions.383 In an ideal situation, the rule makers would not 
know if they would be bidders, procurement officers, or taxpayers 
when the rules are applied.384 Because all are similarly situated, no 
one would design a system where happenstance overcomes rational-
378. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
379. See Op. Md. Att'y Gen. No. 819842, available in 1997 WL 97-029 at *2 (Dec. 23, 
1997) (considering a provision in a procurement contract that provided that 
the contractor was responsible for all damages resulting from its activities in 
connection with the contract, and that the contractor shall indemnify the 
State) . 
380. See id. at *4-*5. 
382. Conversation with Scott A. Livingston and Joseph Grossnickel, Vice President 
of Maryland Regional Sales, IBM (Aug. 18, 1999) (notes on file with the au-
thor). 
383. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (explaining 
that people would not know their places in society in a fair system). 
385. See id. 
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ity, or where certain parties are favored by the rules.386 The goal of 
each would be to strive towards fairness in the procurement process 
as a whole. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Since the enactment of the Maryland Procurement Article in 
1980,387 great strides have been made towards a fair procurement 
system. The procurement laws were implemented to foster vigorous 
competition among bidders,388 to protect the State by ensuring that 
services are provided in the most cost effective manner, to ensure 
fairness, and to protect the public from corruption.389 The statutory 
and decisional body of law that governs procurement furthers these 
purposes.390 
For competitive sealed bidding,391 all requests for bids must be 
published,392 and all potential bidders must be informed of and en-
couraged to attend pre-bid meetings.393 If the State materially 
amends the bid, potential bidders must be notified,394 and bidders 
may not be given unfair advantage by the procuring agency.395 At 
the evaluation stage, bids are considered on the basis of objective 
criteria396 and awarded to the responsible contractor with the re-
sponsive bid that has the lowest evaluated price.397 The rules further 
seek to protect both the State and bidders when a bidder makes a 
mistake in a bid.398 
The same fairness requirements are in place for competitive 
sealed proposals.399 The award of these contracts is based on subjec-
386. See id. (opining that such a method would ensure that people are not ad-
vantaged or disadvantated because they would be able to design a system to 
favor their positions). 
387. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
388. See MD. CODE ANN .. STATE FIN. & PROC. §13-205 (a)(l) (1995 & Supp. 1999); 
COMAR 21.04.01.02A (1999). 
389. See supra notes 23-40, 72-80 and accompanying text. 
390. See supra notes 41-71 and accompanying text. 
391. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
392. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
393. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
394. See supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text. 
395. See supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text. 
396. See supra notes 161-72 and accompanying text 
397. See supra notes 173-215 and accompanying text. 
398. See supra notes 216-57 and accompanying text. 
399. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
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tive criteria and not solely on price.400 The proposal must include 
the factors that will be considered in an award determination.401 Po-
tential bidders are informed of the evaluation criteria.402 The award 
of these contracts, like competitive sealed bidding, must be evalu-
ated in a fair and unbiased fashion.403 
The statutory and administrative structure is additionally bol-
stered by an appeals process that serves the dual purposes of pro-
tecting the State's interests and treating all parties fairly. Bidders, 
who believe they were unfairly denied the ability to bid on or be 
awarded a contract, have an avenue of recourse by filing a pre- or 
post-bid protest with the procurement officer.404 Mter the denial of 
a protest by the procurement officer, a bidder may also file an ap-
peal with the MSBCA.405 The MSBCA ensures that the goals of pro-
curement are met and has the power to hear appeals that challenge 
an award.406 Changes to the procurement laws arise in reaction to 
actions by government officials and potential bidders that go against 
the spirit of fair procurement.407 The common sense of the procure-
ment rules and regulations fosters fairness in the procurement 
system. 
The overriding theme of fairness present in the State's procure-
ment system must be balanced with the need to attract bidders 
while not paying too much of the public treasury.408 Otherwise, the 
system has fewer potential resources for goods and services and the 
lowest possible price or best arrangement will not be produced.409 
Not even political pressures should disrupt this weighing, lest the at-
tractiveness of the state contracts decrease and the taxpayers bear 
the ultimate burden.410 In short, the State bid protest procedure 
supports the State's goals to generate value and to avoid mischief, 
to act fairly and be perceived as acting fairly.411 
400. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text. 
401. See supra notes 264-68 and accompanying text. 
402. See supra notes 269-85, 300-01 and accompanying text. 
403. See supra notes 286-99 and accompanying text. 
404. See supra Part IV.A-B. 
405. See supra notes 350-52 and accompanying text. 
406. See supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text. 
407. See supra notes Part II.C and accompanying text. 
408. See supra Part VI. 
409. See supra Part VI. 
410. See supra Part VI. 
411. See supra notes 383-85 and accompanying text. 
